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THE DETERMINANTS OF LEGISLATIVE SPEECHMAKING ON SALIENT 
ISSUES: THE ANALYSIS OF PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES ON THERESA 
MAY’S BREXIT WITHDRAWAL AGREEMENT USING STRUCTURAL TOPIC 
MODELS 
Artem Goriunov 
Abstract 
This thesis aims to reveal the differences in legislative speechmaking determined by the 
roles, which the members of parliaments (MPs) can play on the parliamentary floor, and 
the effects of debates stages, by the example of the parliamentary debates on the Brexit 
Withdrawal Agreement in the House of Commons. By adopting the strategic and partisan-
rhetoric approach to legislative speechmaking and considering that the content of 
speeches on debates can be shaped by the policy-, office- and vote-seeking motivations 
imposed by the various roles MPs can play in the British parliaments, this study assumes 
that cabinet membership, party affiliation, personal preferences, and time effects can 
produce significant differences in what MPs speak about in the House of Commons 
during the discussions of such multi-dimensional and salient issues as the Brexit deal. 
This study considers the sub-components of the Brexit deal, which were discussed in the 
British parliament, as topics for debates. Deriving from this assumption, the Structural 
Topic Models (STM) were used to reveal the hidden topic structure of the parliamentary 
debates on Theresa May’s deal from July 2018 to July 2019 and estimate the effects of 
the MPs roles and time. To do so, 25559 legislative speeches were collected into a dataset 
using the web scraping techniques and considered as units of analysis. Moreover, the 
metadata for each speech was included in the analysis to apply STM and make inferences 
regarding the possible effects. The topic model was built with 29 topics, which reflected 
the topic structure of the debates on the Brexit deal, allowed to distinguish the 
controversial, niche, and procedural topics of discussions in the House of Commons, and 
to make inference regarding the most salient sub-components of the legislative debates. 
As a result of the estimation of the effects, the fact that whether MPs are cabinet members 
or not implied the significant difference in what topics they contribute more in their 
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speeches. It was shown that government MPs were not able to control the most prevalent 
topics and let others control procedures in the House of Commons. However, government 
MPs were able to focus on topics favorable for Theresa May’s deal, defending the results 
of their work, while other MPs fulfilled their role as government controllers by asking 
parliamentary questions.  
It was inferred that party affiliation also plays a significant role in producing differences 
in emphases of MPs' speeches in the parliament. The MPs from parties, which belong to 
the same coalition, tend to speak equally a lot on topics, which divide them to achieve 
consensus and better policy. However, MPs from the governing Conservative Party 
contributed more to the controversial topics and talks, which were unfavorable for the 
government. It showed that the office-seeking motivations could be not so important for 
Conservatives, and the degree of party rebellion was too high. In turn, this thesis 
confirmed the theory of issue ownership by showing that, even in case of the multi-
dimensional and complex issue, its sub-components can be shared by parties in 
accordance with their traditional policy specializations. Besides, it was proved that large 
parties contributed more to the discussions on controversial issues.    
Personal preferences of MPs also influence the content of their speeches about the Brexit 
deal. By operationalizing the personal preferences through their voting profiles, two types 
of MPs were distinguished – those who voted consistently on the Brexit deal, and those 
who changed their minds along the way or was in doubt. The analysis showed that MPs 
in doubt are less likely to speak on the controversial topics and more focused on niche 
ones than MPs whose attitude towards the Brexit deal was strongly articulated. 
Additionally, it showed that fewer doubts MPs have, the more likely they talk on niche 
topics. However, the mechanisms behind such behavior remained hidden due to the 
specifics of the research method, but they can be examined in future studies.  In turn, the 
hypotheses regarding the negative effects of debate stages on the saliency of controversial 
topics were not confirmed, but the analysis provided important insights on the evolution 
of the Brexit deal debates in the House of Commons. 
The findings of this thesis contribute to the literature on legislative speechmaking, 
legislative behavior, party unity, and can be used for future studies of the Westminster 
systems, British politics, and Brexit. 
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Introduction 
Nowadays, there is increased attention to the condition of parliamentary democracies and 
the challenges they face. To some extent, it can be a result of openness and transparency 
principles applied to the work of parliaments and other political institutions worldwide. 
Technologies made it possible for citizens to monitor what their representatives say, 
which issues they actively discuss, and how they behave in front of the internal and 
external audiences. On the one hand, voters received open access to almost all the debates 
and talks made by politicians and public servants that traditionally were not available for 
most of the voters and took place behind closed doors. Today they exist and are 
distributed in a large variety of formats from written texts and visual records to large 
databases and interactive maps. In this case, legislative debates and legislator’s speeches, 
which previously could be considered and modeled by scholars as ‘cheap talks’ (Austen-
Smith, 1990, p. 125) with no particular impact, gained more attention and started playing 
one of the key roles in decision-making on both electoral and legislative levels.  
Thereby legislative debates have become a prominent research subject for scholars, 
especially once data has shaped in a more convenient form to analyze. Nevertheless, 
legislative speechmaking remains one of the most understudied topics in contemporary 
political science (Bächtiger, 2014, p. 145) since scholars mostly put efforts into studying 
institutional and procedural settings, leaving this form of legislative behavior out of sight 
(Proksch and Slapin, 2012, p. 520). Considering the attention to it gained recently, status-
quo should be changed. 
Real politics also leaves signs of the importance of such forms of legislative behavior as 
debates to be studied comprehensively. A most recent example is the withdrawal of the 
United Kingdom from the European Union (EU), or Brexit, and the following legislative 
debates regarding the agreement with the EU. Following the referendum in 2016, when 
51,89% of British citizens voted for leaving the European Union, the country became 
divided, and the government, along with parliament, started negotiations and law 
adjustments to make Brexit as smooth and favorable as possible for all.  However, even 
if some scholars state that in times of crises and escalations of salient issues, parliaments 
tend to unite with governments helping it to achieve consensus (Blumenau, 2016, p.96) 
and increase the weight of public opinion by striving towards fast issue resolution 
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(Borghetto and Russo, 2018), right after the EU Withdrawal Act became a law on 26 June 
2018, parliament received a veto-power on a ratification of government’s agreement with 
the EU, and it led to three-time rejection of a deal proposed by Prime Minister, Theresa 
May, and her following resignation on 24 July 2019.  
Theresa May’s cabinet was in the status of minority (or ‘hung’) government, which is 
very rare for the United Kingdom, while House of Commons debates on the Brexit deal 
received increased attention from public not only inside but also outside of the United 
Kingdom. Under these circumstances, legislative speechmaking can be a key for 
understanding the latent processes of negotiations within parliaments and those signals 
members of parliaments send to voters and constituencies during the escalations of salient 
and multi-dimensional issues.   
While scholars focus more on institutional (e.g. André et al., 2014),  and procedural 
factors (e.g. Godbout et al., 2019) influencing legislative speechmaking and tend to 
analyze and compare several parliamentary terms as a whole assuming political factors 
held constant, this study aims to reveal the effects of those political factors, which drive 
differences in legislative speeches between members of parliament and variety in 
emphases they made debating the unique salient issues within one parliamentary term in 
the context of Westminster system. Shortly, this research is an attempt to answer the 
following question: which factors make legislators talk differently about salient issues on 
the parliamentary floor? Deriving from the assumptions of theories of legislative 
behavior, party unity, and legislative debates, this study suggests that such factors as 
minister status, party affiliation, personal preferences, and stages of legislative debates 
can be determinants of the legislative speechmaking. 
In order to prove given assumptions and address the research puzzle, this thesis employs 
the analysis of legislative speeches made by the Members of Parliament (MPs) in the 
House of Commons concerning Brexit deal from the period from July 2018 to July 2019 
using Structural Topic Models (STM), a form of an unsupervised machine learning 
algorithm and one of the topic modeling approaches within the natural language 
processing (NLP). To apply this method, legislative speeches for a given period are 
automatically collected with relevant metadata, which reflects the characteristics of 
individual MPs. STM allows incorporating the metadata into the analysis of the hidden 
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topic structure of legislative debates to reveal the differences in topic raised and attention 
paid to them based on MPs characteristics. 
The thesis contains three main chapters devoted to 1) presentation of the theoretical 
expectations and assumptions on the determinants of legislative speechmaking with 
references to previous studies in the field, to importance of each of the potential factors, 
which might affect the content of debates, and to possible hypotheses and interpretations 
of the results; 2) outlining of the research design, overview of case selection and context 
of the debates on the Brexit deal, hypotheses formulation, choice of research method and 
its description, operationalization, and data collection; 3) description of the model 
selection, topic structure, and the analysis of the results.  
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1. Theoretical Background 
Before proceeding with theoretical explanations of the effects various factors may have 
on legislative debates content, it is important to draw a line between this study and the 
achievements in the field that have been accomplished by other scholars so far, to 
distinguish the parts already covered by them, and to determine the theoretical framework 
to which this research will adhere. 
In order to formulate theoretical expectations and conduct the following analysis, one of 
the theoretical approaches should be adopted. There are three approaches to parliamentary 
debates, according to Bächtiger (2014): strategic and partisan-rhetoric approach, 
deliberative, and discursive.  
The first one relies on the assumptions of rational choice theory. Two key principles of 
this approach can be outlined. Firstly, debates allow revealing important information and 
personal MPs preferences, which otherwise would be revealed in any case using other 
instruments such as agenda-setting. Secondly, MPs know that debates can impact their 
electoral success and can be an arena for sending party and personal signals to other MPs, 
voters, and media based on their preferences and interests. In this case, legislative 
speechmaking can be an important stance for legislators for “position-taking, advertising, 
and credit-claiming” (Ibid., pp. 146-147).  The opportunity to use this resource depends 
on the electoral systems: individual MPs may have various constraints on legislative 
speechmaking coming from the incentives of party leaders to keep party unity (Proksch 
and Slapin, 2012).  
The deliberative approach is primarily based on deliberative theory. This approach 
assumes that parliamentary debates serve as an arena where legislators can make more 
informed, rational, reasoned, and justified decisions (Bächtiger, 2014, p.149-150). One 
of the most important distinctions of the deliberative approach from the rational choice 
lenses is that it implies the importance of debates for changing opinions and hence 
positions of other MPs. Even though several studies within the field of deliberation 
studies show that debates fail to enable policy and preferences transformations as a mode 
of political interaction (e.g. Landwehr and Holzinger, 2014, p. 396), they emphasize the 
importance of deliberative bargaining and its stages, which drive changes of preferences, 
and, therefore, behavior on the legislative arena. 
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In turn, the discursive approach is mainly focused on rituals associated with parliamentary 
debates, such as dialogue, symbolic language characteristics, rules, routines, etc. 
(Bächtiger, 2014, p. 159-160). According to the representatives of the discursive 
approach, the parliamentary system has an extensive influence on legislative discourse 
(Häussler et al., 2016), while rhetoric patterns and discourse itself predict roles, party 
affiliation, institutional positions of legislators and parliamentary agenda (Ilie, 2015, p. 
13). 
In this thesis strategic and partisan-rhetoric approach have been chosen as a core 
theoretical framework. It is important to add that here similarly to ideas of Kam (2009, 
p.17), and how they were presented in the research conducted by Bäck and Debus (2016, 
p.20), MPs are considered as strategic actors interested in policy-seeking (or policy-
making), office-seeking (or career advancement), and vote-seeking (or re-election).  
Parliamentary speechmaking has been in sight of political scientists belonging to rational 
choice school for a long time, but extensive growth in the numbers of research began only 
recently. The theoretical expectations on factors, which constitute parliamentary 
speechmaking and its content, are primarily based on assumptions derived from the 
theories on legislative behavior, party unity and competition (e.g. Bäck and Debus, 2016; 
Proksch and Slapin, 2015), and agenda-setting and control (e.g. Rasch, 2014). Even 
though speechmaking itself is a quite understudied phenomenon, factors, which might 
affect the content of parliamentary debates, could be found within models presented by 
scholars who belonged to the mentioned fields of research.  
For instance, a large amount of studies is devoted to understanding the voting behavior 
of MPs through the analysis of roll-call data, which tend to model the legislative behavior 
and explain possible deviations in voting by drawing on deviations from party lines (e.g. 
Poole, 2005). However, some studies raise the necessity to examine speeches as well 
since roll-call data is not enough to explain a variety of personal and intra-party 
preferences (Schwarz et al., 2015). The key argument here is that the voting behavior of 
MPs is easy to evaluate, and, hence, to control by their party leaders and whips. It puts 
constraints on MPs and makes roll-call data are very inconsistent and not insightful 
enough to study real legislative behavior and policy positions. Parliamentary speeches, in 
turn, may reflect the policy preference of individuals better since sometimes, depending 
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on the electoral system and traditions, the control over the content of legislators' speeches 
lacks useful instruments (Schwarz et al., 2015, p. 380).  
Nevertheless, there are several institutional instruments, which provide party leaders 
some degree of control over the speechmaking of backbenchers. Such factors as the 
electoral system, regime type, candidate selection mechanisms (Proskch and Slapin, 
2012, p. 523), various parliamentary (as the time allotted to speeches) (Bäck et al., 2019; 
Giannetti and Pedrazzani, 2016; Godbout et al., 2019;) and electoral rules might be 
extremely important for legislative agenda. They maintain specific incentives for parties 
and MPs to behave in accordance with ‘rules of the game’ or limit their presence on the 
parliamentary floor. For instance, while some political systems (e.g. majoritarian or 
Westminster) do not provide strong incentives for party leaders to keep the content of 
legislators’ speeches in line with party positions, other political and electoral systems (e.g. 
proportional) make it inevitable to limit the access to the parliamentary floor for potential 
rebels.  
Other scholars point out that legislative debates can be perceived as an additional arena 
for electoral competition, where MPs may communicate their ideas and policy positions 
to their constituencies and potential voters (Bäck et al., 2019). It also relates to the notions 
of issue ownership and issue competition, when parties and individual MPs tend to ‘own’ 
salient issues and address them to satisfy their core voters (e.g. Budge, 2015) and to get 
more votes by competing for issue ownership with other parties and MPs over those 
issues, in which addressing their voters are interested in specific time (e.g. Green and 
Jennings, 2019). Besides, some scholars determine the importance of committee 
membership status for electoral competition (Fernandes et al., 2019): committee 
membership implies a possession of exclusive information and qualification in specific 
fields that favors parties in terms of providing specialized knowledge and expertise 
internally (to parties) and externally (to voters), and helps chamber to make ‘good policy’ 
(Krehbiel, 1991, p.). Moreover, when elections come closer, debates on the most salient 
issues intensify and make the legislature more divisive than in other periods (Martin and 
Vanberg, 2014, pp. 439-440). 
There are scholars, who also focus on the role of such individual characteristics of MPs 
as gender in legislative speechmaking, which makes these studies to be closely related to 
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the aim of this thesis. They argue that female MPs tend to spend less time on the 
parliamentary floor and speak less on ‘harder’ issues, but there is a tendency towards 
cross-country variation: unexpectedly, female MPs in Scandinavian countries have less 
time debating than male ones, while in other European countries this distinction is not 
visible (e.g. Bäck et al., 2014; Bäck and Debus, 2016).  
Thus, scholars are mostly interested in explanations on 1) how much time MPs spend and 
speak on the parliamentary floor; 2) which institutional and procedural rules affect debate 
participation; 3) when MPs can and want to speak; 4) and who benefits the most from 
speech delivery in parliaments. However, there is a shortage in studies focused on the 
understanding of how MPs speak and what topics are they prevalently raise on the 
parliamentary floor depending on their political and personal interests. This thesis aims 
to fill this gap. 
Existing research predominantly uses computational text analysis to have an ability to 
analyze a large amount of textual data on debates and incorporate additional political- and 
personal-related variables (e.g. Magnusson et al.,2018; Proksch and Slapin, 2014). For 
instance, Bäck and Debus (2016) presented research, where they were able to catch the 
tendency of individual MPs to deviate from party line using Wordscores approach of 
analysis of parliamentary speeches and applying it to legislative debates in seven 
countries. They assumed and proved that such factors as party, MPs position within party, 
gender, electoral institutions, electoral contest, and constituency problems pressures, can 
determine not only the number of speeches delivered by MPs but also how they deviate 
from the party line. Moreover, Killerman and Proksch (2013) studied British parliament 
and, using the data on speeches in House of Commons from 1996 to 2004, they provided 
evidence that MPs are very responsive to changes in economic, partisan, and electoral 
contexts (Ibid., p. 25). Their focus is in speeches changes driven by escalations of salient 
issues within their constituencies (such as economic shocks): when their seats are prone 
to shocks related to their districts, local issue becomes more prominent for them, but when 
constituencies do not face any shocks, the focus shifts towards national one and related 
to party preferences. The same applies to the dichotomy of government-opposition 
parties: “decreasing national popularity of the government increases the district focus of 
governing MPs and increases the party/national focus of opposition MPs” (Ibid., p. 10). 
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Considering the content and result of these studies, it becomes possible to draw one more 
line between this thesis and the accomplishments of other scholars.  
Most of the studies focus on analyzing the legislative debates in the context of several 
parliamentary terms. There are also comparisons conducted between the legislative 
agendas of various parliaments within one country or between several national 
parliaments, allowing scholars to make assumptions regarding all the issues were on 
parliamentary agenda. However, this study is focused on unveiling how parliamentary 
speeches vary in the context of one salient issue or political shock within one parliament. 
For instance, such an issue as Brexit deal legislation is a complex and salient issue, which 
evolves and cannot be resolved in one-time roll-call voting. It arises multiple discussions 
and consists of several sub-components, focus on which could change over time. This 
thesis aims to shed light on which factors make legislators emphasize different 
components of such issues and talk differently about them on the parliamentary floor. 
Parliaments have to achieve consensus and then adopt respective laws and bills to 
diminish the negative effects of such salient issues, but sometimes it is not happening. As 
per Blamenau (2016) and Borghetto and Russo (2018), these shocks may empower and 
favor agenda-setters (e.g. government in case of Westminster system) and governing 
parties as they require political actions and weaken the role of opposition (Ibid., p. 94). 
However, it is not always observed, and, more specifically, it cannot be applied to cases 
like Brexit when political competition overweighed the potential crisis of a lack of 
consensus.  
The further distinctions of this thesis from other studies lay in the approach employed. 
Firstly, even if various political factors were studied in relation to the content of 
parliamentary speeches, they had not been applied to the context of controversial issues. 
Secondly, while researchers focused mostly on analyzing data in terms of procedural and 
sentiment specifics of legislative speeches and texts, this study employs the notion of 
topic of conversation.  According to Wiesner and her colleagues (2017, p.45), who studied 
parliamentary debates in the framework of discursive approach, “the entry of topics onto 
the parliamentary agenda deserves to be analyzed in terms of the heading of the topic and 
by whom it was initiated”. They argue that new topics can be introduced from motions 
and amendments proposed on the parliamentary floor, but it is not always true since only 
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motions could not represent parliamentary debates fully. These headings are not always 
visible and loudly pronounced, and sometimes should be classified by the content. 
Parliamentary debates are not so straightforward, and various topics can be raised by MPs 
within the discussion on completely different agenda items. Moreover, such agenda 
propositions can also be refused. Other scholars also studied topics entry to parliamentary 
agenda from the perspective of motions and amendments by looking into the example of 
the UK parliament (Abercrombie et al., 2019). They managed to show that policy 
preferences can be derived from motions. However, as stated above, policy preferences 
communicated through motions and amendments cannot provide the whole picture and 
extract all the topics discussed during parliamentary debates. Thus, this thesis operates 
with topics as analytical units, and political determinants of legislative speechmaking 
within the context of debates on only one salient issue. 
Furthermore, by taking into consideration both incentives of political actors (whether it 
is government, parliament, political parties, or individual MPs) derived from rational 
choice approach and long-term policy shocks (such as inability to achieve consensus in 
parliament on of the salient and multi-dimensional issues consisted of variety of sub-
components), we might already hypothesize that decisions and legislation devoted to 
resolving such situations will go through multiple stages of negotiations, amendments, 
and actions of bargaining. It leads to the assumption that topics, which various MPs will 
be focused on while resolving this salient issue, can vary in their importance and 
prevalence on the legislative agenda. Moreover, it is common that issues evolve and 
develop through time by acquiring various emphases. This assumption is elaborated 
further below in Section 2.2, devoted to the formulating of research hypotheses. 
To elaborate more hypotheses, one should consider three incentives of MPs derived from 
the strategic approach of parliamentary debates mentioned before: policy-seeking, office-
seeking, and personal vote-seeking. Further, in this chapter, these incentives are applied 
to three roles, which MPs can play in parliament. At the same time, they can be ministers, 
party members, and hold their individual preferences and interests. Such an application 
will allow capturing differences in topics they raise on the parliamentary floor and help 
to conduct conceptualization of key notions used in current study. 
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1.1. Collective approach: the role of government in legislative 
speechmaking 
One of the roles, which MPs can play on the parliamentary floor within the Westminster 
political system, is to be a part of the cabinet, or, in other words, is to be a government 
minister. It means that along with being a member of parliament with legislative power, 
they also hold a ministerial portfolio providing them with executive power. Therefore, 
these MPs combine two different roles, which imply various incentives and goals put on 
them. Considering that governments are the main policymakers and policy-seekers in 
contemporary political systems, they are most interested in formulating new policies and 
hence in adopting these policies, transforming them into laws. Besides, MPs who belong 
to the government should also be interested in not only keeping their seats in parliaments 
but also in holding ministerial offices. However, they should be re-elected to do so, and 
it presupposes peculiar political behavior aimed at getting more votes on the following 
elections. These three elements can be extrapolated on legislative behavior and legislative 
speechmaking as well. As mentioned above, by speaking on the parliamentary floor, MPs 
can articulate their positions for awareness of their competitors and make signals to 
potential voters. It helps them to shape behavior accordingly and to achieve the mentioned 
goals. In this case, the content of legislative debates can change depending on the 
participation of the government members since their goals and preferences comparing to 
those who are not a part of the cabinet might be different. Confirmations of these 
assumptions can be found in the theoretical literature. 
First, the government is a policy-seeker, and it has several crucial instruments that are 
used for pushing policies on the parliamentary table and then to pass them into laws. 
Governments can control parliamentary agenda to do so, and, for instance, in the case of 
the Westminster system, governments tend to make legislative agenda their own (Bowler, 
2010, p.477), while parliament’s influence over agenda is extremely low (Russell and 
Cowley, 2016). As a collective with potentially the same goals, government MPs should 
be interested in setting the agenda, which favors their proposals. Agenda-setting, as 
proposed by Müller and Sieberer (2014, pp. 320-321), is primarily proposal power, and 
agenda-setter is the one who makes ‘take-it-or-leave-it’ proposals to other actors. In this 
case, government decide which bill, amendments, proposals, and hence topic, will be 
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discussed and voted for during the parliamentary meetings. It can be done by them using 
procedural agenda-setting rules parliaments have. According to Rasch (2014), such 
instruments as timetable control, proposal and amendments rights, veto rights and 
gatekeeping, and sequencing and ordering. It is also important to note that government 
control over the agenda can be maintained further by drafting power it possesses (Ibid., 
p. 469). Tsebelis and Rasch (2011, pp. 2-3) also argue that tools for agenda control can 
be distinguished into three methods: institutional (embedded into parliamentary 
procedural rules applied by agenda-setters), partisan (majority parties controlling 
proposals coming to parliamentary table), and positional (majority of MPs may prefer 
new policies over status-quo). Thus, the key factor of political influence derived from 
agenda control is an opportunity to determine who speak on the parliamentary floor, and 
what issues can be discussed (Geese, 2019; Green-Pedersen, 2010; Rasch, 2011). 
According to other scholars and their models (Romer and Rosenthal,1978; Cox, 2006), 
governments (or government MPs) as agenda-setters have both positive and negative 
agenda power. Positive agenda power refers to the power to propose laws, topics of 
discussion, or ideas that significantly change or challenge a status-quo, and to ensure that 
all of them emerged on the parliamentary agenda, and then properly discussed. Negative 
agenda power implies that agenda-setter can prevent some issues from being brought on 
the parliamentary agenda and to make sure that unfavorable proposals for them are not 
passed but delayed or canceled. 
One may infer, considering these findings, that the government is more likely to control 
the most important and prevalent topics on the parliamentary floor. It assumes that while 
MPs who belong to the government might use the same strategy for policy-seeking. While 
government MPs control the most important topics and talk more about them, other MPs 
may handle more niche topics, which, considering possible negative agenda power of 
government, should not be too controversial. 
Moreover, by considering all the tools available for government MPs and MPs without 
any portfolio1 in the parliaments, one may infer that parliamentary debates consist not 
only of usual discussion on issues, but also include procedural, formal, and informal talks. 
 
1 It should not be confused with ‘ministers without portfolio’, a phenomenon peculiar mostly for coalition 
governments and related to minister, who is technically a member of the cabinet, but de-facto does not 
have any specific competencies or responsibilities. 
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For instance, for the Westminster system, they can be such as points of order, discussion 
of the business of the house, various interventions, questions to MPs, and expressions of 
gratitude for debates.  Government MPs as agenda-setters should control those and speak 
about them more to be able to shape the legislative agenda in a way they prefer, while 
MPs without executive power do not control many of them if any. The latter appears more 
visible for shadow cabinets in the context of the Westminster system. They tend to be 
latently formed from members of opposition parties, but still very weak in terms of 
procedural powers (Eggers and Spirling, 2018). 
Second, both government MPs and those without any portfolio are office-seekers. As for 
their motivation, government MPs would like to keep their offices, while MPs without 
office strive to gain offices in the future, and thus, they both adopt various strategies to 
achieve these goals. To keep their offices, governments MPs should consider the role of 
the whole government in propositions and law-making. Since all of them work together 
and coordinate their actions, cabinet MPs do not have any incentives to vote against the 
government’s proposal and speak on issues unfavorable for the government as a whole 
(Rasch, 2014; Bäck and Debus, 2016). Otherwise, ministers do risk to lose their office by 
being suspended, while the government takes a chance not to survive until the next 
election. Thus, government leaders and ministers have enough motivation to stay in the 
same positions all the time and speak only in favor of government proposals. 
To strengthen its position in front of the parliament, government MPs can also use such 
a tool of agenda control as the request for a vote of confidence. If governing parties and 
other members of parliament shows their confidence in government by voting, the 
government will proceed with its responsibilities with more agenda power and impose 
more discipline on backbenchers (Bergmann et al., 2018). 
Nevertheless, pattern of legislative speechmaking for those MPs with and without 
portfolios can be explained further by the concept of so-called ‘mega seats’ (Bäck and 
Debus, 2016, pp. 38-40). By holding or seeking for ministerial positions as examples for 
these ‘mega seats’, MPs might be different in a way the behave and speak on the 
parliamentary floor. Those who are ministers are motivated to speak in favor of 
government proposals, as assumed above. However, it is not so simple for MPs who are 
not related to government positions. They can be distinguished into two groups: 
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backbenchers from governing parties and MPs from opposition parties.  For 
backbenchers, as MPs without mega seats, it can be crucial to support government 
proposals in parliamentary debates, but only for those, who are keen to gain office on the 
next elections (Becher and Sieberer, 2008). However, there are those backbenchers who 
do not seek to participate in government and hold any executive office along with 
opposition MPs. For the latter, likely, they are not going to speak in favor of government 
proposals, while, for first ones, it is assumable that they will speak more on niche topics 
not interfering in government’s business. 
Thus, government MPs should fully support legislative proposals made by them on the 
parliamentary floor, while MPs without executive power might be different in what they 
speak about. For the latter, contextual factors and, for instance, party discipline should be 
considered to make inferences. However, for Westminster systems where seats are 
divided almost equally between government and opposition parties and backbenchers 
have less incentives to be tied with party labels, it can be the case that MPs without any 
ministerial portfolio talk more about topics unfavorable for government proposals or 
niche ones, as suggested above, since they are not so interested in ministerial portfolios 
but other political gains.  
Thirdly, regardless of whether MPs are in government or not, they are interested in being 
re-elected. However, ministerial and non-ministerial roles may imply completely 
different emphases while speaking on the parliamentary floor. Presumably, these 
incentives are primarily related to policies the government put on the legislative agenda 
and their general effect on status-quo. The most important notions regarding vote-seeking 
of MPs are parliamentary control over government, and hence instruments provided for 
this purpose (Müller and Sieberer, 2014, pp. 323-324). The key strategic tools during 
legislative debates for opposition MPs and some other MPs without executive power are 
questioning and interventions or interpellations (Otjes and Louwerse, 2018; Vliegenthart 
et al., 2010).  
According to Martin and Vanberg (2014) and Vliegenthart and Walgrave (2011), the 
opposition is more likely to ask questions on salient issues than government parties and 
speak significantly more on issues that divide government and opposition. They tend to 
use the resource of questions to distinguish themselves from government positions. In this 
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case, it can also be applied to MPs who do not belong to the government. If it is common 
for MPs from opposition parties, backbenchers from governing parties might also use this 
resource to take positions far from government ones to seek votes in cases when 
government or party’s popularity decreased. Besides, non-ministerial MPs from 
governing parties may also use questions for policy advocacy: by asking right questions 
to government MPs, they can help them to defend their positions (Vliegenthart et al., 
2010). In this case, one may infer that legislative speeches provide an opportunity for 
defending government positions by responding to questions and explain the prosperities 
of government proposals (Rasch, 2011), while non-ministerial MPs can take the 
parliamentary floor to criticize government, intervene government speeches to diminish 
their persuasive effect, and appeal to backbenchers to make them allies (Vliegenthart and 
Walgrave, 2011). 
Thus, it can be inferred that government MPs and those without a ministerial portfolio 
have incentives to speak differently on the parliamentary floor, considering their policy, 
career, and vote-seeking goals. Since party differences in legislative speeches have been 
slightly mentioned above, it is important to go on to explain more on how the role of party 
affiliation can affect the legislative speechmaking of MPs. 
 
1.2. Between collective and individual: coalitions, parties and issue 
ownership  
Political parties can be considered as unitary actors in the political arena, while their MPs 
are delegates of these parties on the parliamentary floor (Bergmann et al., 2018, p. 6). In 
this case, party affiliations of MPs might play a key role in the explanation of differences 
between how they focus on various salient issues, and what makes them speak in 
particular ways during the legislative debates. Moreover, parties themselves meet the 
necessity to push policies they propose in parliament, increase the possibility to allocate 
their members to government positions, and receive more votes on the election. Party 
positions in the legislature can also be supported with speeches they make, and proposals 
or amendments they put forward. Since it helps parties in terms of ‘position-taking’ within 
parliaments, and signals they send to voters, it can be assumed that legislative 
speechmaking is crucial for them to achieve those goals. 
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From the perspective of policy-seeking, it is important to outline that in contemporary 
democracies parties tend to create coalitions or parliamentary party groups to get a 
majority and make changes to status-quo happen (Giannetti and Benoit, 2008). 
Constraints put on parties do not allow them to freely adopt laws they prefer but create 
incentives to negotiate with other parties to achieve consensus and, hence, the support of 
the majority if the government faces a minority stance (Martin and Vanberg, 2014, pp. 
437-439). According to Vliegenthart and Walgrave (2011, p. 1055), members of 
coalitions and respective MPs are less likely to ask questions to the government than the 
opposition on the parliamentary floor. However, ‘position-taking’ is something that 
divides members of the coalition: they prefer to speak significantly more on issues, which 
make them distinct from each other (Martin and Vanberg, 2008), and allow to show voters 
how active are they on the parliamentary floor in defending their interest. Nevertheless, 
one can assume that parties from the same coalition tend to talk equally (in terms of 
amount of time) on topics, which divide them. In terms of policy-seeking, it means that 
by speaking on these issues, they are trying not only send signals to voters but also to 
resolve possible internal misunderstandings and conflicts. Otherwise, if one compares 
issues raised by parties from different coalitions, these parties presumably should differ 
significantly in the emphases they make since they do not strive to the same policy goals. 
Furthermore, parties might be arenas for their members to promote themselves in terms 
of career advancement, and, therefore, government office. The motivation for office-
seeking behavior is primarily embedded in government-opposition parties’ dichotomy. It 
can be assumed that in Westminster systems incentives to be promoted can be quite high 
for members of governing parties, while for members of opposition parties it strongly 
depends on the next elections, this and cannot have too much impact on their legislative 
behavior, and, hence, legislative speechmaking. However, it is crucial for further analysis 
to determine if there is any mechanism to influence legislative speechmaking within 
governing and opposition parties.  
As per Slapin and Proksch (2014), parties are motivated to support the same policy 
positions in the parliament and in front of the external audience to capture votes and keep 
the office they currently hold. As it was discussed concerning government MPs, the most 
important tool is control over the agenda. Here one should go down from the level of a 
government position to the positions within parties. Since the agenda controlled by 
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various actors is often pre-determined, there is no window of opportunity for parties and 
their members to emphasize or de-emphasize topics within it (Ibid., p.133).  In turn, 
Saalfeld and Strøm (2014) distinguish the characteristics of parties from the lenses of the 
principal-agent framework, as it was also elaborated further by Proksch and Slapin (2015) 
who added party brand at the core of their conception. They argue that party actors are 
strongly dependent on hierarchies built within parties, and, hence, party leaders and intra-
party relationships affect their incentives and legislative behavior sufficiently. In this 
model party leaders are perceived as principals, while backbenchers are considered 
agents. For legislative speechmaking, it means that there can be a variety of instruments, 
which party leaders and, for instance, whips, can use to get their co-members coordinated 
and motivated to act and speak according to the party line. It refers to the notions of party 
unity, cohesion, and discipline.  
There are two strategies for party leaders to keep agenda safe from the deviations from 
the party line either by avoiding discussion on topics that divide party members or by 
imposing discipline on them (Kam, 2014, p.403). The first strategy refers to negative 
agenda power, which is discussed above. In turn, the usage of this strategy strongly 
depends on the electoral system and the incentives it provides for MPs. As it was noted 
by Killerman and Proksch (2013), party label and its value within the electoral system are 
key to understanding the actions of party leaders towards enhancing party discipline. If 
this label is important for electoral success, as it can be for a proportional system, party 
leaders will be concerned about what their party members speak on the parliamentary 
floor and will try to eliminate the possibility for party rebels to participate there. In turn, 
in majoritarian systems (for example, in the United Kingdom), where MPs are strongly 
tied with their constituencies, party leader won’t risk to lose positions in constituencies 
rebellion MPs are from, and will allow them to speak freely in parliament, even if there 
is a possibility of damaging party label (Ibid., p. 7). It means that deviations from the 
party line in a proportional system are less likely than in majoritarian systems. In the latter 
case, backbenchers should be more active speakers, and less afraid of being punished for 
their speeches.  
However, the issue of office-seeking still cannot be resolved for majoritarian systems, 
considering these findings. Governing parties under the first-past-the-post electoral 
system are keen to apply positive agenda power, to which the second strategy refers, to 
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resolve this issue and protect government offices. The most powerful instrument there is 
an ability of government to put forward a motion of confidence, on which members of 
governing parties should vote (Kam, 2014, pp. 403-404). Besides, the opposition also has 
an opportunity to propose a no-confidence motion to vote against the government. In both 
cases, it implies the same: the necessity for party leaders to discipline their members. For 
governing parties, it significantly more important since this action directed mostly to its 
members. If the government loses confidence motion, it suggests snap elections, and, 
hence, that party members will lose all their positions and gains they have from being in 
the office or parliament. In cases of confidence votes, MPs from governing parties are 
often not ready to accept such losses and have to vote for the government that eventually 
leads to the more extensive support for government proposals from the backbenchers 
(Kam, 2014, p. 404-405). By ensuring the confidence coming from their party members, 
governing parties make them more motivated to speak in favor of government proposals, 
or not to speak at all. It means that if the government survived the vote of confidence, 
backbenchers, and thus all members of government parties should be more motivated to 
speak in favor of government proposals. By doing so, leaders of governing parties do 
both: preserve their offices and control what can be discussed by backbenchers on the 
parliamentary floor. This case is also similar for opposition parties: if it loses the vote of 
no-confidence against the government, the government will improve its position within 
parliament, but for the opposition, it usually does not affect party leadership. 
Moreover, it means that after each of the votes of confidence, which government wins, 
government proposals should be discussed in a more ‘disciplined’ way. Considering that 
most of the controversial proposals may end up with government winning vote of 
confidence, it can be assumed that more votes of confidence won by the government on 
the way to passage of their proposals, the more incentives MPs have to talk in favor of 
these proposals, or to talk less on controversial topics. This assumption will be further a 
basis for one of the hypotheses of this research. 
However, if the vote of confidence works predominantly to ensure government survival 
in office and party discipline, so-called selective incentives work for both governing and 
opposition parties to make their members comply with the party line on the parliamentary 
floor (Kam, 2014, pp. 410-411). One of these selective incentives related to office-
seeking is that parties and their leaders are responsible for career pathways and 
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promotions, respectively. In this case, party leaders may impose incentives for 
backbenchers by promising (whether directly or indirectly) position in government in the 
future. Since it usually implies high costs for backbenchers to rebel against a party in 
these circumstances, they will most likely support government proposals. The risk for a 
party member to be suspended is also important since being a party member is one of the 
most crucial, even required, steps to government position (Ibid., p. 411). 
Thus, by taking also into account the idea of party-system agenda proposed by Green-
Pedersen and Mortensen (2010), opposition MPs always tend to criticize government 
proposals during parliamentary debate ‘on whatever issues they deem advantageous’ 
(Ibid., pp. 262-263), while governing parties, considering all the instrument party leaders 
there have at their disposal for discipline maintenance, will mostly speak in favor of 
government proposals.  
From the perspective of vote-seeking, some of the parties can be perceived by voters as 
being better on some issues since parties tend to ‘own’ some of the issues while ignoring 
others (Slapin and Proksch, 2014, p. 129-131). Scholars also refer to this phenomenon as 
policy specialization (e.g. Saalfeld and Strøm, 2014) or issue ownership (e.g. Budge, 
2015; Green and Jennings, 2019). To provide some examples, one may think of green 
parties as to the best choice for those caring about ecology and environmental issues, or 
labor parties as being better in social policy and on labor market issues. According to 
Sigelman and Buell (2004), one should expect parties to diverge in attention to various 
issues. Parties might have the best reputation at dealing with some of them, and hence 
they ‘own’ them, it implies electoral gains. Electoral advantages come into place due to 
the exclusive ability of parties to address issues, which cannot be addressed or spoken by 
any other party. By pushing such issues to the legislative agenda, eventually, parties can 
get more support from their voters.  
Wagner and Meyer (2004) argue that the decision towards choosing issues to focus on is 
strategic. Scholars argued on the role of party organization for issue ownership and 
summarized that large parties tend to ‘ride the wave’ and choose issues to speak on 
following the contextual factors, while smaller parties focus more on niche issues they 
handle the best since they do not have enough resources to compete with large ones. Thus, 
they distinguished two strategies: to address issues, which currently concern voters in a 
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given time, or to address issues, which party has ownership over (Ibid., p. 1022). Klüver 
and Sagarzazu (2016) presented an evidence that ‘ride the wave’ strategy is dominant 
nowadays, especially in Germany.  
For the current study, there is an important finding that issue ownership can be extracted 
and estimated from legislative speeches (Green-Pedersen and Mortensen, 2010; 
Vliengethart and Walgrave, 2011). Besides, as it was argued by Vliengenthart and 
Walgrave (2011), one of the ways for the party to establish ownership over issues is party 
manifesto. However, manifestos are not enough to examine the latent positions of MPs. 
They also argue that opposition parties are more likely to stick with the party manifesto 
in their speeches than MPs from government parties (Ibid., pp. 1038-1039). Opposition 
parties sometimes are not large enough to affect the decision-making substantially, and, 
in this case, they tend to ‘own’ one certain issue and win seats by preserving this 
ownership on the parliamentary floor.  
Moreover, large parties tend to adjust their policy positions to the saliency of the issue 
for voters or themselves (Abou-Chadi et.al., 2019). It refers to the concept of the issue 
saliency, which is widely used in the context of this thesis. Salient issues are those issues, 
which concern voters and politicians most in a given time, and significantly affect the 
political situation. Such salient issues might also have subcomponents, which are also can 
have various levels of saliency depending on the context.   For instance, in the case of this 
thesis, only one complex salient policy issue has been chosen for examination, and the 
core idea is to determine sub-components, which produce division in how MPs talk about 
this salient issue depending on their roles in parliament. The saliency of the issues can be 
changed over time under the pressure of political or exogenous shocks (such as change 
of public opinion), or endogenous factors (such as an economic situation) (Bergmann et 
al., 2018). Thus, even if some issues are stated as prominent in the party manifesto, it 
does not mean that it will be so over the whole parliamentary term, and legislative 
speeches may reflect the shifts of positions better (Ceron and Greene, 2019). Parties may 
shift their positions not only in response to shocks but also in response to issues other 
parties own. It refers to the concept of issue competition. This competition implies that to 
get more votes, parties should carefully select which issues to emphasize, and how to 
make opponents' issues leave the agenda. Moreover, parties tend to speak on issues they 
are competent in and let others speak on issues out of their competence (Green-Pedersen, 
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2010). If there are issues, which concern voters, but interested parties do not have enough 
competence, they will probably try to get it to face challenges. 
Besides, one may assume that in the context of parliamentary debates on salient issues, 
parties will tend to speak more on issues they own, and by responding to political shocks, 
large parties can be inclined to mix issues they own with those on the agenda. To provide 
the list of most common issues that parties might own in contemporary politics, one can 
refer to the study of Bäck and Debus (2016, p. 30). They determined that (1) socialist and 
social democratic parties are related to labor and welfare issues, (2) conservative parties 
tend to own issue related to finances, law, foreign policy, domestic policy, and justice, 
(3) green parties are owners of environmental and climate change issues, (4) while 
economic issue, some topics of justice, law, and citizen rights mostly belong to liberal 
parties. Also, there are parties, which represent citizens based on nationalities and 
territories, such as the Scottish National Party in the UK or New Flemish Alliance in 
Belgium.  
Thus, the theory provides us with expectations that MPs from specific parties may tend 
to speak more on topics their parties own and consider salient in a given time because it 
helps them to attract more voters and keep the core electorate. In turn, large parties might 
mix the attention to recently emerged salient issues with attention to those issues they 
traditionally own since they have more resources and competence to debate on them, 
while smaller parties remain on their traditional positions. 
 
1.3. Individual approach: backbenchers and personal preferences 
So far, MPs have been observed in this study as political actors, which can play two roles 
in parliament: the role of minister and party member. However, according to the rational 
choice approach, MPs might also have personal preferences shaping their legislative 
behavior and legislative speechmaking. Nevertheless, MPs are often constrained by the 
public opinion in constituencies and office responsibilities in parliament or government. 
It can be so that they affect legislative speechmaking significantly, especially considering 
the role of a backbencher. In Westminster system, backbenchers can be considered as 
‘pivotal voters’, since government and opposition are rarely successful without the 
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support of their party members who seat behind them (Krehbiel, 1998; Russell and 
Cowley, 2016).   
It should be stated that concerning personal preferences, MPs without incentives to 
deviate from the party line are not the ones this study focuses on. It is assumed that the 
preferences of complete supporters or opponents of the government and its proposals in 
each particular case are primarily determined by the factors discussed above. Even if MPs 
who have a sustained opinion on issues can be used for comparison between those who 
made a decision and those still in doubt, they are not central for further analysis.  In turn, 
backbenchers have more potential incentives to deviate from the party line and speak 
differently on the parliamentary floor than others. Thus, the latter is outlined in this 
section as one of the theoretical expectations of this research. To evaluate the possible 
effect of personal preferences on legislative speechmaking, one should consider the 
arguments related to constraints backbenchers might have and their goals related to 
policy-, office-, and vote-seeking. 
From the perspective of policy-seeking, backbenchers might be interested in their policy 
ideas to be implemented since most of them are committee members in Westminster 
parliaments. A powerful committee system creates an opportunity for backbenchers to 
influence policies according to their preferences, but at the same time, it implies fewer 
incentives to deviate from the party line (Kam, 2014, pp. 411-412). In this case, party 
leaders provide backbenchers with an ability to influence policies by appointing them in 
the parliamentary committee, but, at the same time, party leaders continue to control their 
legislative speechmaking. Party leaders are interested in backbenchers from committees 
as experts in specialized policy fields, who possess knowledge and information required 
for party success, and these backbenchers are allowed to speak mostly on niche topics 
they are competent in (Fernandes et al., 2019, p. 29). Thus, party leaders resolve two 
issues at the same time – they strengthen party unity and narrow down the number of 
topics backbenchers can raise on the parliamentary floor. For backbenchers and their 
policy-seeking motives, it means that if they speak on controversial topics or vote against 
party, they can lose their office, and hence an influence over policymaking. Backbenchers 
can also affect policymaking by proposing private members’ bills (PMBs) to 
parliamentary agenda. However, according to Bowler (2010), even if in the Westminster 
system these are widely used by MPs, only a few bills pass the parliamentary voting. He 
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argues that this tool is more aimed at gaining attention from constituencies to gain more 
votes, and rebellion expressed in roll-call votes or speeches is more effective than policy 
proposals (Ibid., p. 477). Backbenchers might also switch parties to get an opportunity 
for more extensive policymaking (Mershon, 2014), but it can be considered as last resort 
and mostly applicable members of small parties. 
The same situation can be seen with motivations of backbenchers towards office-seeking. 
Since committee membership (as committee membership can be perceived as ‘mega 
seat’) imposes the same disciplinary rules on office-seeking backbenchers, they will 
speak on the parliamentary floor in the same way as discussed above. If there are no 
incentives for them to become committee members, then there is nothing for 
backbenchers to do to get the government office but supporting party leaders and 
negotiate. However, this motivation to support government can only appear in a situation, 
when the government proposes office to the backbencher in exchange of parliamentary 
votes and support on debates. It can happen as a result of bargaining and negotiations – 
one of the tools the government actively applies to overcome uncertainty (Rasch, 2014). 
It can take various forms of “persuasion, problem-solving, compromise, side-payments, 
and logrolling” (Ibid., p. 471). Additionally, when the government or party leaders are 
not able to bargain, they may try to anticipate the preferences of their party members and 
draft bill accordingly. For backbenchers in Westminster system, it means they can rebel 
against their party during voting or debates, but if they want to get the high office, or if 
they negotiated with party leaders on being promoted, they are less likely to deviate from 
party line and more likely to speak on niche topics than other backbenchers. Thus, 
backbenchers should sacrifice their positions to have an opportunity to affect policy or 
get a higher office. This trade-off can be explained more by considering the vote-seeking 
motives of MPs. 
MPs can preserve their seats in parliaments only by being re-elected in their constituents. 
If they are not elected, they won’t be able to express policy- and office-seeking behavior 
efficiently. Most often this is the reason why vote-seeking opportunities and the role of 
constituency overweigh all other incentives, and MPs still prefer to rebel against their 
parties on the parliamentary floor and during voting. It assumes that backbenchers are 
predominantly vote-seekers, which is confirmed by a variety of scholars especially for 
majoritarian and Westminster systems, where incentives for personal votes are stronger 
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(André et al., 2014; Burean, 2015; Høyland and Søyland, 2019; Kam, 2014). Regarding 
such MPs, party leaders also have tools to constrain and manage the content of their 
legislative speeches.  As per Tromborg (2019), party leaders tend to impose discipline on 
district-oriented MPs by managing issues they can raise on the parliamentary floor. If 
party leaders consider some issue salient for them, they are interested in sanctioning 
district-targeted behavior on this issue. On the contrary, if the issue is not salient for the 
party, they “do not sanction district-targeted position taking among their candidates” 
(Ibid., p. 321). Thus, backbenchers, who are strongly concerned in supporting the interests 
of their constituencies to be re-elected in the future, are limited in their access to the 
parliamentary floor with speeches on controversial topics, but free to express an opinion 
on niche topics.  
It can be inferred that despite personal preferences and goals of backbenchers, their 
behavior on the parliamentary floor is monitored and controlled by the party leaders in 
the comparatively same way, which leads to the same implications for legislative 
speechmaking. Here one may assume that considering salient and complex issues, which 
can be discussed for a long time and go through the large amounts of reconsiderations, 
changes, and amendments to be proposed and voted for, personal preferences of 
backbenchers and their changes over time are quite hard to detect. For analysis, such 
backbenchers can be conceptualized as MPs, who are in doubt towards the government 
proposals put on agenda. It is also can be called as the spatial ‘error’ (Carroll and Poole, 
2014), which is out of the line of spatial preferences (Bräuninger et al., 2016; Poole, 
2005). However, if scholars considered these ‘errors’ as deviations from personal MPs' 
ideological standpoints, here it is assumed as a deviation from party and government 
standpoints. Their doubts can be determined by examining a way they vote, and this is 
the case when roll-call votes can shed light on MPs' positions. If a salient policy is taken 
together with several important votes cast for or against it, then MPs, who are in doubt, 
can be revealed. In the process of legislative decision-making, it can be the case that once 
party leaders detect the rebellion against the party line, they will start to actively impose 
disciplinary measures. Consequently, the closer the end of discussion on salient issues, 
the more likely backbenchers are disciplined in both speechmaking and voting, and hence 
the more they will favor government proposals. This assumption distinguishes 
backbenchers in doubt, for whom personal preferences can play a key role, from 
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backbenchers who fully support or oppose government proposals and should not be 
disciplined regardless of party affiliation. If one aims to examine how personal 
preferences and constraints make a difference for legislative speechmaking on specific 
policies, it is important to capture those backbenchers, who express their doubts through 
legislative voting behavior. Thus, MPs can be considered as being in doubt towards 
government proposal, if they vote inconsistently for proposals in legislature and change 
their preference over time, by so producing a spatial 'error'. For instance, the more votes 
backbenchers cast in favor of the policy proposals, the less they doubt it. For parties it 
can also mean the following: backbenchers from government parties can be considered 
in doubt if they voted against the government even once, and for opposition backbenchers, 
it happens when they vote for government policies despite the negative position of their 
party towards the government proposal.  
Regarding legislative speechmaking, one should consider that party discipline and doubts 
are things that can be determined in both static and dynamic ways. As for a static way, 
one may assume only a parliamentary voting profile without considering time. That is, if 
MPs vote inconsistently towards one complex issue, it reveals their backbencher status 
and implies that they could be targets of party discipline. By adding theoretical 
expectations on personal preferences and legislative speechmaking, it can be suggested 
that generally, MPs in doubt tend to speak more on niche topics and raise constituency 
specific issues than MPs who consistently vote for or against government proposals.  
As for a dynamic way, one should consider the bargaining process, issue evolution, and 
other effects of time. Debates on the multi-dimensional issues can take much time and 
require voting on a substantial amount of amendments. Between these events, there are 
windows for party leaders to receive information on rebels and impose discipline on party 
members accordingly. This implies that by the end of the discussion and voting on 
government proposal, there will be full information available, and by comparing how 
many votes for and against this proposal were cast, one can infer who was in doubt in less 
or more degree. For legislative speechmaking, it means that more MPs are in doubt, the 
less time they were affected by disciplinary actions, and, hence, the more they spoke on 
controversial topics. The last assumption here is that to less degree MPs are in doubt 
towards government proposal, the less controversial topics they raise on the parliamentary 
floor. 
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For both static and dynamic circumstances, party discipline is constant and considered as 
intervene variable. Disciplinary measures will be imposed on backbencher if any signs of 
voting rebellion are observed. In turn, such a rebellion is an indicator of MPs’ doubts. 
Considering that, according to the theoretical expectations, disciplinary measures could 
potentially lead to the more niche topics discussed by backbenchers, the assumptions 
above are made.  
Since all possible theoretical explanations presented regarding legislative speechmaking 
and its determinants, research design and hypotheses can be elaborated. 
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2. Research Design and Data 
This study employs a quantitative single-case research design. To be more precise, it 
means that only one case – parliamentary debates on Theresa May’s Brexit Withdrawal 
Agreement (Brexit deal) - is chosen for analysis, but since a large number of legislative 
speeches are analyzed in this context, and the results can be generalized only on 
legislative speechmaking related to this particular case (or Westminster systems), 
quantitative approach can be used for testing hypotheses.  
This thesis is dealing with the research puzzle implying that parliamentary discussion on 
the Brexit withdrawal agreement can be considered as a deviant case. Such an assumption 
derives from the unmet expectations: the British parliament is an ideal representation of 
Westminster system, under which government should have a strong control over agenda 
(e.g. Russell and Cowley, 2016) and all governing party members, including 
backbenchers and potential rebels, should unite around government in response to 
political shocks to preserve their political presence (or to survive), and send persuasive 
signals to voters (e.g. Bergmann et al., 2018; Blamenau, 2016; Borghetto and Russo, 
2018). In the case of the UK-EU negotiations over Brexit, Theresa May was not able to 
unite governing party members and potential supporters from other sides around her to 
pass the proposed Brexit deal through parliament. It was caused by the legislative 
deadlock, which can be considered as an endogenous political shock. From this 
perspective, the Brexit deal, which was discussed on the parliamentary floor for more 
than one year, is an example of complex salient issues MPs faced. In turn, Theresa May’s 
lost in parliament regarding the Brexit deal could be seen from the dynamic of 
parliamentary debates.  
This assumption is made because on debates MPs can pursue their own goals, persuade 
others, and express opinion, legislative speeches may shed light on differences between 
them in terms of on what topics they speak on and how are they talking about various 
issues (e.g. Bäck and Debus, 2016: Proksch and Slapin, 2015). By adjusting the fact that 
the Brexit deal is salient and multi-dimensional issue for legislators with the importance 
of legislative debates for policy-, office, and vote-seeking, it can be suggested that MPs 
can speak more differently on such an issue than they usually do. One may assume that 
there are factors, which make legislators focus on completely different sub-components 
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of a salient issue at the same time and hold different positions on them. The argument of 
this thesis is that such factors as roles MPs play in parliament and effect of time should 
determine those differences. Legislative debates usually consist of topics of discussion 
put on the agenda, and one may assume that it is the layer, where the problem is located. 
Different political and personal preferences, along with the effects of time and party 
discipline, may affect what topics are discussed and by whom, which could imply 
divisions within the legislature. Thus, the research question is which factors make 
legislators talk differently about salient issues on the parliamentary floor?  
The case of legislative debates on the Brexit deal is chosen not only because this issue 
represents one of those multi-dimensional and salient issues, consisting of many sub-
components, but also for other reasons. Firstly, the UK parliament is a form of 
Westminster parliament with its peculiarities and disadvantages. Secondly, the number 
of intra-party rebellions was detected during legislative debates (e.g. many Conservatives 
opposed May’s deal and favored No-deal scenario). Thirdly, the British government 
operated under the minority situation, when they did not have an absolute majority in 
parliament, and thus was forced to negotiate, to bargain, and to convince opponents in 
debates. The latter is very rare for Westminster parliaments.  
The timeframe from July 2018 to July 2019 has been chosen. Since the starting points on 
the Brexit withdrawal agreement were formulated in July 2018 in the form of the so-
called Chequers Agreement dedicated to outlining the main focal points of the future 
relationships between the UK and EU. Debates in the UK parliament started after this 
event, which also led to several important minsstrial resignations. In July 2019, Theresa 
May announced her resignation, and her proposals left out of the parliamentary sight. 
Legislative speech is a unit of analysis in this study. Considering the veto power, which 
House of Commons obtained right after the EU Withdrawal Act became a law on 26 June 
2018, legislative speeches within this chamber are examined. Legislative speeches chosen 
as analytical units since they are widely used in today’s social and political studies in the 
context of research field on legislatures (e.g. Geese, 2019; Hajdinjak et al., 2019; Høyland 
and Søyland, 2019), they better represent what is happening with agenda-setting process, 
which tends to occur behind closed doors (Otjes, 2019), and comparing to roll-call data, 
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they provide more exact information on MPs positions and can supplement roll-call votes 
(Bergmann et al., 2018; Schwarz et al., 2015).  
Topics, which raised by MPs on debates, may correspond to the overall topic structure by 
taking together and reveal the hidden agenda components.  Martin and Vanberg (2014) 
argue that it can be done by considering words spoken as data and then by applying 
computational text analysis. This study applies structural topic models (STM), the 
extended form of Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) algorithm created to extract topics 
from a large amount of textual data. Structural topic models provide an opportunity to 
include covariates (factors) into the analysis and locate specific relationships between text 
and its characteristics. In the case of legislative speeches, one might consider such as 
factors as speakers and their characteristics and estimate how these characteristics explain 
differences in speeches. This research method is discussed further in this chapter in more 
depth in section 2.3. To apply STM appropriately, data should be collected and 
transformed into a relevant format. The description of data and data collection process 
are presented further in this chapter in section 2.5. 
Finally, there are some theoretical and practical limitations of this study, which must be 
listed. From the theoretical perspective, the key limitation is that the mechanism of 
dependency of legislative speeches on MPs roles and time effects is hidden. This study 
assumes several possible mechanisms, observed theoretically and by other scholars, and 
considers them constant to address such an issue. Moreover, this thesis focuses on a single 
case, meaning the limited external validity of the results. However, the results can be 
further applied to compare Westminster parliaments with each other and checked upon 
sustainability on similar cases related to salient issues in the context of the British 
parliament.  
There are also two limitations, which lay between theory and practice. First, this study 
does not aim to estimate legislators’ positions but to capture the factors, which might 
influence their behavior on the parliamentary floor. For instance, for the hypothesis on 
personal preferences, which is formulated below, roll-call data is used to determine the 
personal profile of MPs. However, there are scholars, who resolve this issue by applying 
Wordscore or Wordfish – computational text analysis techniques aimed at extracting 
policy positions from political texts (e.g. Bäck and Debus, 2016; Bergman et al., 2018). 
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Regarding the current paper, this step does not correspond with research goals and would 
provide results unnecessary for hypotheses testing. Second, since this study deals solely 
with the case of parliament debates on the Brexit withdrawal agreement, only speeches 
related to this case are collected for the analysis (the process is described below in section 
2.5). However, in theory, debates on Brexit might also contain speeches and talks on 
irrelevant topics, which can be suddenly raised by MPs due to some unexpected events 
or other factors. If large amounts of speeches are collected for the analysis, manual or any 
other filtering tools cannot exclude the possibility of such talks to remain in the data.  
From the practical perspective, the limitations can be the following: the choice of the 
number of topics for the analysis, a potential bias during the interpretation of topics, and 
computational limitations such as system requirements and calculation time. In addition, 
this thesis does not examine the speeches of those MPs who abstained from more than 
one meaningful vote, because STM does not operate with missing values. The possible 
limitations of the research method are discussed below in section 2.3. in more depth.  
In this chapter, the context of parliamentary debates on the Brexit withdrawal agreement 
is discussed, and hypotheses formulated by taking into account both theoretical 
expectations and contextual features. Further, the choice of the research method is 
justified, and the method is described in-depth. In the last two sections, the 
operationalization of variables is conducted, and the collection of data is described.  
 
2.1. Parliamentary debates on the Brexit Withdrawal Agreement: 
background 
The research field on the parliamentary debates on the Brexit withdrawal agreement and 
events surrounding them are still in the state of origin. Mostly scholars deal with 
predicting economic consequences of Brexit (e.g. Hantzsche et al., 2019) and analyze the 
results of referendum (e.g. Alabrese et al., 2019), which is not quite important for the 
current study to consider. Thus, in this section, this thesis mostly operates with known 
facts to describe the case and information extracted from the official dictionaries 
(Glossary – UK Parliament, 2019), reports of the House of Commons (Walker, 2019), 
data on legislative votes derived from official sources (House of Commons Divisions, 
2019) , and  the recent research of Lynch and his colleagues (2019).  
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After a long discussion actively took place from 2014 to 2016, James Cameron’s 
government and the House of Commons decided to conduct a referendum on the United 
Kingdom status within the EU. During the political campaign, the political space of the 
UK was divided into those who supported European politics and ideas (‘Remain’) and 
those who were against the UK being in the EU (‘Leave’). While the Labour party, 
Liberals and Scottish National Party were complete against the UK’s withdrawal from 
the EU and campaigned for ‘Remain’ vote, the UK Independence Party (UKIP) and 
several rebellions from the Conservative Party (e.g. Boris Johnson) represented the 
‘Leave’ position. Conservative party remained mostly neutral to this referendum allowing 
their members (the same was true for the Labour party) to support any of these positions 
towards Brexit. Leading by predominantly economic and immigration-related arguments, 
the ‘Leave’ campaign was more successful. On 23 June 2016, 51,89% of British citizens 
voted for the ‘Leave’ campaign on the referendum regarding the UK withdrawal from the 
European Union. The resignation of David Cameron from the leadership of the 
Conservative Party, and hence, from the position of the Prime Minister, followed these 
events. He was succeeded by Theresa May in July 2016.  
In order to deliver Brexit, there is a requirement to trigger Article 50 of the Treaty of the 
European Union, which is aimed at outlining the lawful procedure of negotiations and 
following the withdrawal of the EU member country from the Union. On 29 March 2017, 
Theresa May’s government triggered Article 50 with the permission of parliament and 
started the process of the UK withdrawal from the European Union. Considering that 
almost all the UK laws should be adopted for the independent existence (from the EU 
laws) and reformulated to ensure a smooth transition, it led to the active work of 
parliaments and committees, including debates and internal negotiations (Lynch et al., 
2019, p. 51-52). Right after Article 50 was invoked, Theresa May asked for a snap 
election to increase the presence of the Conservative Party in the parliament and make 
her negotiations go more smoothly through parliament. This goal was not achieved and 
led to an even worse situation for Theresa May: “It led to a single-party minority 
government at Westminster, opening up further opportunities for parliamentary 
influence” (Ibid). By establishing a coalition with Northern Ireland Democratic Union 
Party (DUP), Theresa May tried to improve her positions towards the Brexit-related 
legislation in the House of Commons. Nevertheless, this situation provided the parliament 
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with more power to shape the agenda and oppose the government proposals on the UK-
EU negotiations. 
Thus, the parliamentary floor and committees became the key arenas for discussions 
affecting the decision-making process on each stage of the UK government and the EU 
negotiations. Negotiations formally started on 19 July 2017, and the arrangements for 
further negotiations and formal procedures of Brexit were made. They resulted in the 
European Withdrawal (2018) Act, which became law on 26 June 2018 and granted the 
UK parliament a veto-power on ratification of the withdrawal agreement. In turn, 
negotiations with the EU led to the Chequers agreement (or plan). The white paper agreed 
and published on 12 July 2018 by the government and listed the key principles of the 
future UK-EU relationships regarding Brexit. As per Lynch and colleagues (2019, p. 60), 
the Chequers plan “finally brought Eurosceptic discontent to the fore”. By being 
dissatisfied with this plan, Brexit Secretary and Foreign Secretary, Boris Johnson, 
resigned from their government offices. It became a critical juncture for further 
negotiations with the EU. It was not accepted by the government's opponents due to the 
economic principles and positions on the Irish border. On 14 November 2018, the 
government published the draft of the Brexit Withdrawal Agreement, and the active 
debates on the Brexit deal began in the House of Commons. However, Dominic Raab 
also opposed this draft and was the second Brexit secretary resigned in opposition to the 
agreement in 2018. Thus, for this analysis, it is important to rely on parliamentary 
speeches after the Chequers agreement was published and to take July 2018 as a starting 
point.  
Parliamentary debates on the Theresa May’s Brexit deal are associated with many 
amendments, statuary instruments, reconsiderations, negotiations between various 
parties, and several ‘meaningful votes’ (MV). The latter are key ones as they were aimed 
at parliamentary ratification of the agreement. In this regard, Theresa May lost the first 
MV on 15 January 2019, “with the government suffering a huge defeat, losing the vote 
by a majority of 230 (with 202 voting in favor of the Prime Minister’s Brexit deal and 
432 against)” (Walker, 2019, p. 40). Then Theresa May’s government revised the deal 
and proposed ‘Plan B’ amendments. In turn, the second MV was also lost by the 
government on 12 March 2019 (with 242 voting in favor of the Prime Minister’s Brexit 
deal and 391 against) (Ibid., p.47). It is crucial to note that the Withdrawal agreement was 
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proposed in conjunction with the Political Declaration on the future of UK-EU 
relationships, which was also strongly opposed by most of the Theresa May’s opponents. 
To make the House of Commons vote on the deal again, the government removed the 
Political declaration from the voting agenda and motioned on the third MV only on the 
Withdrawal Agreement. It was an option since 29 March 2019 was a deadline for the UK 
to leave the EU, but the extension of the deadline was agreed with the EU in case the third 
MV is for government proposal. It was also done in order to be on a safe side and does 
not allow ‘no-deal’ Brexit. On the third MV, took place on 29 March 2019, government 
lost as well with 344 votes against to 286 for the Withdrawal Agreement. Then the 
government was not able to bring the new version of the Withdrawal Agreement and 
conduct the fourth vote. This situation led to Theresa May’s resignation from the Prime 
Minister post and the leadership of Conservative Party on 23-24 July 2019.  
Theresa May’s Brexit deal was rejected by the House of Commons three times, and it 
shows that the government not only lost the support of the opposition but also was not 
successful in gaining support from the governing party backbenchers and coalition 
partners. So, there is a reason why parliament in this period can be called as 
‘backbenchers’ parliament’ (Lynch et al., 2019, p. 54).  Nevertheless, following the 
results of MV, it can be stated that Theresa May was still able to articulate some degree 
of support. On the second MV, the government deal received more support than on the 
first one. The third MV was also an indication of increased support for the deal in 
comparison with the second one. One may assume that it can be a result of the cross-party 
and intra-party bargaining and, to some extent, the effect of party discipline: those MPs, 
who were in doubt, changed their mind over the voting stages.  
To explain the ups and downs in the context of the current research, one may refer not 
only to legislative speeches but also to the role of the vote of confidence. Considering the 
positive agenda power of confidence motions won by the government (Kam, 2014, p. 
404), it should be an important tool for the government. Despite Theresa May’s won on 
the confidence vote over her Conservative Party leadership on 11 December 2018, the 
no-confidence vote, which was proposed by opposition on 15 January and took place on 
the next day, should be considered the most important in terms of party discipline. Since 
there were no better alternatives for Theresa May in the Conservative Party, she won this 
vote without any observable obstacles, but considering the huge (and even historical) 
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defeat on the first MV, it seems to not have an impact. Otherwise, after no-confidence 
vote won and Plan B amendments passed, noticeable progress was made towards party 
unity.  
To understand what brought the division into parliament concerning the Brexit deal, one 
should investigate controversial topics raised on the parliamentary floor. According to the 
timeline (Walker, 2019), studies on the committee’s activity (Lynch et al., 2019) and 
known facts, controversial issues can be determined. The key controversial topic was 
concerning the arrangements on the border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of 
Ireland, often referred to as the Irish backstop. It includes the issues of economic zones 
and customs unions, along with single-market notions. It was the issue, which divided the 
governing party and coalition partners from the DUP when the latter was against the 
government solution to this issue. Other parties were also against Theresa May’s 
arrangements on the Irish backstop because they were sure this proposal will tie the UK 
to the EU for a long period and hinder the full withdrawal from the EU. Irish backstop 
implied Northern Ireland being the single customs territory and formally remaining as the 
part of the European single market (and hence under the effect of EU trade laws) until the 
solution would be found after the transition period. Regarding the Irish backstop and trade 
between the EU and the UK, increased attention was paid to the controversial food and 
agricultural policy related to tariffs, standards and, for example, fisheries. The 
arrangements for the latter was agreed to be outside of the Irish backstop plan, so fisheries 
should have become the subject of the normal EU tariffs.  
Moreover, the discussions on No-Deal, Canada-plus, and Norway scenario also refer to 
controversial, since they were not in favor of government proposal. No-Deal scenario 
implies the UK withdrawal without any agreement and proposed by the rebellion 
Conservatives as an option in case of government’s withdrawal agreement not passing 
the parliament. Canada-plus scenario implies the same trade rules for the EU as they are 
for Canada, while Norway-scenario is an option to join the European Free Trade 
Association and European Economic Area, and trade with the EU on the principles 
applied in Norway. 
Opposition parties, namely the Labour Party, Liberal parties, and Scottish National Party 
(SNP), introduced and supported the idea of the second referendum on the Brexit, which 
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was consequently blocked by parliament on 14 March 2019 but was still under 
consideration. The extension of Brexit was also heavily discussed in relation to the 
government's inability to get the appropriate deal and deliver Brexit. Along with the 
overall criticism of the government, extensions of deadlines on Brexit led the government 
to deal with an additional overhead, which was a result of its failure to get this deal passed. 
Thus, the discussions of the second referendum and extension of Brexit deadlines, 
together with overall government criticism, brought controversy and tensions on the 
parliamentary floor.  
Besides, the government was criticized for its economic proposals proposed in the 
Withdrawal Agreement. It primarily relates to the vague status of the EU citizens, who 
work in the UK and their relatives, and the ‘divorce bill’ coverage that presupposes 
enormous payments to the EU.  
The government was also under the pressure of Scotland opposition, where most of the 
population voted against Brexit, and SNP (which represents the interest of Scotland in the 
House of Commons) opposed the government proposal accordingly in relation to the 
opinion of the Scottish constituencies. It also created overhead for the government since 
it was required to handle the issues and negotiate on the withdrawal agreement content, 
which potentially could affect the Scottish economy significantly. 
Apart from these controversial issues, there were many other important questions to be 
resolved and debate on, but in the context of this study, we could consider them niche, or 
those favorable to government proposal, since they were not those issues, on which 
decision cannot be made without significant reconsiderations of the initially proposed 
deal. 
While studying the parliamentary debates on the Brexit deal, it is also important to 
mention the speechmaking procedures of the House of Commons, which might influence 
agenda, and help both government and opposition to present their ideas on the 
parliamentary floor. The key procedures, according to the glossary of the UK parliament 
(2019) and MPs’ guide to procedure (2019), can be as follows: questions to the 
government, business of the house discussions, points of orders, requests for legal advice, 
petitions readings, statutory instruments outlining, interventions. As the House of 
Commons is supposed to control the government, likely, government will mostly respond 
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to questions and set an agenda by such procedures as business of the house discussion, 
and statutory instrument (secondary legislation) propositions, while opposition might ask 
questions, use interventions, and request for a legal overview of the bills and amendments 
on the agenda.  
Information provided in this section is enough for further investigation of the 
determinants of speechmaking of MPs in the UK on the Brexit deal. The knowledge of 
the facts and context regarding debates on the Brexit withdrawal agreement presented her 
supplement the formulation of the hypotheses, which is conducted in the following 
section. 
 
2.2. Hypotheses 
Considering the theoretical expectations outlined in the first chapter, and specifics of 
legislative debates on Brexit deal, the respective hypotheses can be formulated to find out 
what make legislators speak differently about salient issues on the parliamentary floor.  
Firstly, reminding the role of government for MPs and its possible effects on legislative 
speechmaking, one should consider government agenda control, which is a feature of the 
Westminster system. In terms of agenda control, it can be expected that the government 
tends to control more salient issues on the parliamentary agenda (or speak more on them) 
and control procedural topics, such as the business of the house, statutory instruments, 
and others. It derives from government policy-seeking incentives. Thus, the hypotheses 
to be tested are the following:  
H1.1. Government MPs control more (or speak more on) salient topics than MPs 
without a position in government. 
H1.2. Government MPs control more (or speak more on) procedural topics than MPs 
without a position in government. 
From the perspective of office-seeking incentives, theoretical expectations are that 
government MP should support their proposals to hold their office and, for others, it is 
not so important so they can speak on topics and issues unfavorable for government 
proposals. 
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H1.3. Government MPs are more likely to speak on topics favorable for the government 
proposal, while MPs without a position in government are more likely to cover topics 
unfavorable for the government’s proposal. 
Government MPs, as well as others, can be considered as vote-seekers. However, they 
have different procedural responsibilities and incentives. Government MPs should defend 
policies they propose to the parliament and respond to questions regarding these 
proposals. In turn, other MPs can use the parliamentary floor to criticize the government 
or intervene in their speeches (interventions are allowed in Westminster parliament), by 
asking more questions or casting doubts on what has been said by government MPs. In 
this case, it can be tested, if:   
H1.4. Government MPs are more likely to respond to questions in parliament, while 
MPs without a position in government tend to criticize the government and use 
interventions. 
Second, as expected from theory, party affiliation might also affect the legislative 
speechmaking on salient issues. MPs are tied to their party brands in various degrees, and 
sometimes party leaders can impose disciplinary measures on them to keep party 
positions safe from potential rebels on the parliamentary floor. However, one should 
consider the roles of coalitions in policymaking, government and opposition parties in 
office-seeking, and issue ownership, which helps parties to get more votes. 
For parties from the same coalitions, it is important to achieve consensus, and, at the same 
time, to preserve their positions in front of external (voters) and internal (parliament) 
audiences. The latter refers to the strategy of ‘position-taking’, which coalitions parties 
use to distinguish themselves from their partners. As theory implies, coalitions parties 
tend to speak equally a lot on topics, which divide them for those the reasons of position-
taking and consensus achievement. For instance, in the case of Brexit deal, it can be so 
that neither Conservatives or Democratic Union Party (DUP) control or speak more on 
the Irish backstop issue since the government solution to it was not met positively by 
DUP. Thus, the following hypothesis can be tested: 
H.2.1. MPs from parties of the same coalition are less likely to differ significantly in 
speaking on topics that divide them during debates than MPs, whose parties are from 
different coalitions. 
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Moreover, governing parties aim to hold their offices in parliament as long as they can. 
To do so, they should be able to maintain party discipline. Since governing parties have 
very effective tools for this at their disposal, it can be assumed that MPs from the 
government party should speak mostly on topics, which are favorable for government 
proposals. Meanwhile, the opposition party does not possess any executive seats, so they 
are free to criticize the government and focus more on vote-seeking strategies. In this 
case, the hypothesis will be tested, as follows: 
H2.2. MPs from the governing party are more likely to speak on topics favorable for 
government proposals, while MPs from opposition parties are more likely to speak on 
controversial and unfavorable topics. 
Regarding vote-seeking, parties can be perceived as ‘owners’ of some issues. For 
instance, the Labour Party can own topics related to the social security and labor market, 
while Green Party owns environmental topics. Issue ownership is embedded in traditions 
related to parties, but if they face new and multi-dimensional issues, they should also 
focus on sub-components of these issues, which are closely related to those they usually 
own. For the case of Brexit deal, one of such important sub-components can be the 
mentioned Irish backstop. Moreover, as derived from theory, large parties should speak 
more on the most important sub-components of salient issues since they have more 
resources and expertise than small and niche parties. Therefore, the following hypotheses 
can be tested: 
H2.3. MPs are more likely to speak on topics their parties own and consider more 
salient on the parliamentary floor. 
H2.4. MPs from large parties are more likely to speak on topics related to the most 
important sub-components of salient issues, while MPs from small parties are mostly 
focused on niche topics. 
Third, it is important to test if there are the effect of personal preferences on legislative 
speechmaking, and how successfully party leaders control their backbenchers. In section 
1.3., it was argued that despite the strategies backbenchers select to achieve their personal 
goals, which are primarily related to vote-seeking and constituency-oriented behavior,  
party leaders have extensive influence over what backbenchers allowed to speak about on 
the parliamentary floor. In all the cases, such control leads whether to complete opposition 
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of backbenchers to their parties or more disciplined behavior. In turn, disciplined 
speechmaking of backbenchers is characterized by them speaking on niche topics or those 
related to district-oriented less salient issues. The concept of ‘MPs in doubt’ was 
presented in the theory section to determine those backbenchers who tend to cast doubts 
on party politics, i.e. vote inconsistently on proposal their party has formulated an opinion 
on. Voting profile of each backbencher is used to determine these inconsistencies. 
Besides, one may expect that MPs’ doubts and party discipline can be considered as static 
and dynamic. Static doubts are derived from the general voting profile of MPs, and if 
MPs voted inconsistently even once, they would be targets of disciplinary measures of 
their party leaders. In this case, it is expected that generally, such MPs will speak more 
on niche topics than MPs who consistently opposed or supported policy solution. Thus, 
the following hypothesis will be tested: 
H3.1. MPs in doubt are more likely to speak on topics regarding niche and regional 
issues than MPs who voted consistently on the government proposal. 
MPs doubts and party discipline can also be considered in dynamic. For instance, in case 
of Brexit deal, there were three rejected meaningful votes on Theresa May’s deal. 
However, each time she was able to get more supporters of her proposal among those in 
doubt. It can be suggested that after each of the vote there were negotiations and 
disciplinary measures implementation, which could drive such changes of minds.  
Moreover, the earlier she managed to get a backbencher to be supportive to her policy 
proposal on Brexit, the less time in total this backbencher spent to speaking on 
controversial issues related to Brexit. If one considers meaningful votes as a point of 
estimation, then the less ‘Noes’ MP casted on government proposal, the less opportunity 
she or he has to speak on topics unfavorable for Brexit deal. Then, hypothesis can be 
formulated, as follows: 
H3.2. The fewer doubts MPs have on the government proposal, the less controversial 
topics (issue) they raise on the parliamentary floor 
In addition to the hypotheses formulated above, the effect of time can also be examined. 
Sometimes bills are forgotten after the end of parliamentary session, but sometimes “bills 
never die” (Döring, 2001). In this case, the first assumption refers to the vote of 
confidence. Confidence or no-confidence motions towards government are expected to 
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be disciplinary measure since they show to backbenchers and other party members the 
costs of government resignations. Usually after government survives such motions, 
governing party becomes more disciplined on the parliamentary floor. In the case of 
Brexit, the most influential vote was the vote of no-confidence on January 16, 2019 that 
was proposed by opposition, but strongly encouraged by Theresa May herself. Despite 
that month before there was vote of confidence within Conservative party, it is argued in 
this thesis that the closeness of the vote of no-confidence to second and third meaningful 
votes was more crucial for the British government than its own confidence motion also 
won by May. Hence, it can be tested, if: 
H4.1. MPs are less likely to speak on controversial topics after the vote of confidence 
than before the vote of confidence took place. 
By considering possible negotiations, consensus achievement, disciplinary measures 
imposed by governing party leaders on backbenchers, issue evolution, and agenda 
control, the following hypothesis can also be tested: 
H4.2. The more stages of parliamentary debates have passed, the less likely 
controversial topics will be discussed. 
Thus, all hypotheses are formulated according to the theoretical expectations and the 
specifics of legislative speechmaking in Westminster system. Now it is important to 
describe the research method applied to test these hypotheses.  
 
2.3. Research method 
This study relies on one of the computational text analysis techniques called Structural 
Topic Models (STM). This method has been elaborated by Roberts and his colleagues 
(2014) and represents an extension of Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) topic models by 
allowing the introduction of covariates into the model to capture the effect of this 
covariates on documents (Ibid., p. 1067). Along with other topic modeling techniques, 
this method has been applied to a testing variety of hypotheses, including those related to 
the legislative speeches. For instance, Geese (2019) applied STM to reveal the factors of 
speechmaking on the immigration-related issue in the German Bundestag. He concluded 
that the effect of being in a parliamentary party group explains the variance of speeches 
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and differences between MPs better than any individual incentives. In turn, other scholars 
(Hajdinjak et al., 2019), who applied STM on the parliamentary debates textual data, 
inferred that legislative speeches and their content are influenced by the context of a 
policy on the agenda. They compared the data on migration policy debates in Canada and 
the United States and concluded that large parties in these countries tend to emphasize 
different sub-components of the migration policy and own them on the parliamentary 
floor accordingly. Moreover, Høyland and Søyland (2019) used STM to reveal the effects 
of time and events on the legislative speechmaking. They successfully tested hypotheses 
on the influence of electoral reform on the content of parliamentary speeches. For 
example, they showed that electoral reform in Norway (from single-member districts to 
multi-member districts) led to more party cohesion on debates. 
To address the research question stated above and reveal the determinants of different 
speechmaking attitudes, STM can be applied to the parliamentary debates on the Brexit 
withdrawal agreement. Since by using this method it’s possible to estimate the effects of 
political factors (or for this thesis - roles, which MPs play on the parliamentary floor), 
and time effects on the topic structure of speeches and how often each topic was discussed 
by MPs, and since it allows to indicate the difference in topic allocation across mentioned 
covariates, this research method fully corresponds to the goals of this thesis. 
Before proceeding with the analysis, it is important to lay out the specifics of this method 
and possible limitations. STM is a form of an unsupervised machine learning algorithm 
and one of the topic modeling approaches within the natural language processing (NLP)  
(Roberts et al., 2014). It was built on the advantages of LDA methods and share most of 
the specifications and limitations of this method. The key assumption of topic models is 
that it treats each text as a mixture of topics while considering each topic as a collection 
of certain words (Blei et al., 2003). By doing so, it estimates the distribution over words 
for each topic, and the proportion of a document in each topic, for each document. 
Therefore, it allows to examine what topics are mentioned in the corpus of documents (by 
interpretation of words these topic are associated with) and to reveal how these topics are 
distributed within each of the document (each document can consist of more than one 
topic). This method helps to classify the large amounts of documents by revealing the 
hidden topic structure of the whole corpus without a time-consuming human coding 
(Ibid.).  
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STM adds to this method the availability to estimate the effect of metadata of the 
documents or covariates on the topics within corpora in two ways. It presumes that topical 
prevalence (refers to how much of a document is associated with topic) and topical 
content (refers to the words used within a topic) varies across attributes of each document 
(Roberts et al., 2017). In this case, Robert and his colleagues (2014, p. 1068) noted that 
their STM model differs from LDA due to the following parameters: “1) topics can be 
correlated; (2) each document has its prior distribution over topics, defined by covariate 
X rather than sharing a global mean; and (3) word use within a topic can vary by covariate 
U”. For the current research, the topical prevalence model fits the research aims and 
questions stated, while no topical content covariates should be observed. In this case, 
according to the authors of the model (Ibid.), the topical prevalence model implies 
drawing topic proportions from a logistic normal generalized linear model (GLM) based 
on the covariates, which allows the expected document-topic to vary across several 
selected covariates rather than across general mean of the corpus.  For instance, in the 
case of the current research, legislative speeches are considered as documents, while their 
characteristics (such as the name of the speaker, party affiliation, time of the speech, etc.) 
can be considered as metadata, or covariates if included in the STM model. Thus, STM 
additionally allows calculating which topics are prevalent for given corpus of documents 
(by showing topics proportions over the whole corpus), and then to estimate the effect of 
covariates on these proportions. As a result of such estimation, it can be inferred how 
covariates explain the presence and prevalence (and to what degree) of certain topics in 
the documents, and thus in the whole corpus. The latter can be done by running ordinary 
least squares (OLS) regression with the topic-proportions outcome as a dependent 
variable, and covariates as independent ones.  
To conduct this analysis, STM (as well as other unsupervised topic models) requires two 
steps: text preprocessing and selection of the number of topics (K-value).  As for the text 
preprocessing, one may refer to the best practices listed by several scholars in the field, 
such as Lucas with his colleagues (2015) and Banks and others (2018). Firstly, the corpus 
of textual documents should be collected with the relevant metadata without any missing 
values and duplicates. Second, the text should be transformed into the document-term 
matrix (DTM). DTM is a matrix, where each column devoted to the single word and each 
row to the single document, while the cells contain measures on how much time the word 
 48 
 
is used within a respective document. o construct DTM, one might assume texts and 
documents as ‘bag-of-words’, where each text is a vector of separate and unique words 
associated with this text (Lucas et al., 2015, p. 257) with no particular order in mind. 
However, to get meaningful results and eliminate the possibility of extreme sparsity and 
bias from the extremely frequent words (too many zeroes in DTM represent sparse terms, 
while most frequent words affect distribution and interpretability, according to Zipf’s 
law), several techniques should be applied and steps made: 
 Removal of invalid and duplicate texts 
 Tokenization of the texts (creating vectors of unordered words or ‘tokens’ for each 
document in the corpus) 
 Stop word removal (the removal of words with a high occurrence in the language 
of documents. For example, it can be such words as ‘the’, ‘is’, ‘and’ in the English 
language) 
 Normalization (transforming all letters in words into lower case, removing white 
spaces, punctuation, signs, etc.) 
 Stemming or lemmatization (stemming is supposed to remove the endings of 
conjugated verb or plural nouns, leaving just the ’stem’ (Lucas et al., 2015, p.257) 
and very useful for analysis of English corpora, while lemmatization identifies the 
base form of a word and group these words together, but instead of removing the 
end of words, it returns ‘lemma’, or common form of the word identified from the 
origin of the word (Ibid., p. 258)).  
 Sparse and most frequent terms (the process of removal of the terms, which occur 
rarely in documents and produce sparsity, and those commonly used words, which 
does not provide importance for interpretations and negatively affect distribution) 
After these tasks are done, the final version of the DTM can be constructed for the 
analysis.  
The second step towards the STM analysis is an appropriate choice of the number of 
topics the research assumes to be present in the corpus of documents. There are two ways 
to choose the value of K – theoretical expectations and statistical tests of the models, but 
there is no exact procedure to evaluate this confidently and the 'right' number of topics to 
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choose for any corpora of documents (Grimmer and Stewart, 2013). If a theory does not 
provide any expectations regarding the number of topics, statistical methods of model 
selection can be applied in ‘iterative fashion’ to choose the appropriate value of K, while 
the number between 2 and 100 topics are most reliable and interpretable for contemporary 
studies (Banks et al., 2018).  
As for model quality, there are five statistical estimations, which allow researchers to 
compare and choose the most reliable model depending on their goals. By considering 
these statistical techniques, it is important to keep in mind the trade-off between 
interpretability and predictability of the models since predictability tends to negatively 
correlate with interpretability (Chang et al., 2019). The first measurement is the 
document-completion held-out likelihood (or perplexity), which refers mostly to the 
predictability power of the model. This test estimates the probability of words appearing 
within a document when those words have been removed from the document in the 
estimation step (Roberts et al., 2017, p. 34; Wallach et al., 2009). The second 
measurement is a lower bound on the marginal likelihood, which refers to the rate of 
model convergence (Cheng et al., 2015) and embedded into the spectral initialization 
applied by STM by default (Roberts et al., 2016b). Spectral initialization also allows 
avoiding the multi-modality (Wesslen, 2018, p. 9). The third measurement is one of the 
most important and refers to residuals’ checks (Taddy, 2012). Since the high residuals 
shows the overdispersion and make results less interpretable and, to some extent, biased, 
indicating the necessity for larger number of topics, this measurement can be used to 
select the appropriate number of K. The fourth and fifth measurement are often used 
together – semantic coherence and exclusivity – and responsible for the interpretability 
of the model. Semantic coherence is a measure, which calculates the frequency with of 
the high-probability words co-occur together in documents, and thus depicts the internal 
cohesion of extracted topics (Mimno et al., 2011). Exclusivity measure refers to the 
estimation of the probability of words to occur within documents. Exclusivity can be 
considered high if the topic consists mostly of words, which occur in this topic with a 
high probability but with a low probability in other topics. If both measures provide high 
results for one topic or most of the topics in the model, this topic and model can be 
considered semantically meaningful and useful (Roberts et al., 2014, p. 1071). In the 
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current research, residuals checks, semantic coherence, and exclusivity are considered as 
key measurements for evaluation and selection of models and the number of topics.  
After the appropriate number of topics chosen and model specified and ran, STM provides 
the researcher with the topic structure of the whole corpus of the documents by showing 
the topics by their prevalence in the corpus and words associated with these topics. To 
make meaningful interpretations and apply further estimations, there is a need to label 
these topics in accordance with words associated with them. As a supplementary 
procedure and validation step, documents, which are associated with topics, can be read 
for better inference on topic labels. Firstly, the topics should be evaluated and labeled 
based most frequently used words in topic and on the FREX terms, or words, which both 
frequent and exclusive for given topics, and have their frequency-exclusivity score 
(Bischof and Airoldi, 2012). For more accurate labeling, the documents with the highest 
proportion of words associates with given topics can also be examined.  Furthermore, to 
allocate various topics to groups and reveal the network these topics create, topic 
correlations, which shows to what degree topics are close to each other in terms of words 
and documents within, can be used to make inferences. 
Thus, STM as a research method has been chosen for the following reasons: it allows (1) 
to reveal the topic structure of a large number of texts without time-consuming human 
coding, (2) to incorporate covariates within topic model to examine the effect of 
covariates (extracted from metadata, or documents characteristics) on the topical 
prevalence; (3) to control model specification and choice of the number of topics to 
produce better results.  
STM has many advantages, and its application is primarily possible due to the existing 
‘stm’ package for R (statistical programming language), which was developed by Roberts 
and his colleagues (2017) and used for this analysis. 
Despite many advantages of this method, several limitations are worth mentioning. First, 
STM allows only to extract topics and reveal the influence of covariates, meaning that it 
does not provide the possibility to measure, for example, political positions of speakers 
or semantic peculiarities of their speeches. Second, the choice of the optimal number of 
topics is an ambiguous task and often based only on the analysis of word frequencies and 
exemplar documents, which is worse than usual human coding. Third, topic model 
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analysis is not a fully computational task, and still requires the labeling and interpretation 
conducted by the researcher, which, considering specifics and machine learning nature of 
STM, is not always a straightforward and easy task to complete. Fourth, the selection of 
the model is always a trade-off between predictability and interpretability. Scholars 
should always keep in mind their research goals and pick that fits them better. In turn, 
this creates a risk of biased results.  Fifth, STM does not estimate models, which contain 
any missing values in the metadata. It presupposes the high quality of data that sometimes 
cannot be achieved. Sixth, the text preprocessing includes techniques, which can 
potentially affect the meaningfulness of texts. Seventh, STM is very demanding towards 
the computational system and can be time-consuming, depending on the size of corpora. 
STM shares this disadvantage with many other machine learning and NLP models. For 
scholars, it always means basic computational limitations and increases the time needed 
to conduct an analysis.  
Thus, the flow of an analysis using STM can be distinguished into the following 
sequential steps: (1) text preprocessing to make data feasible for exploration and 
transformation into document-term matrix; (2) model specification, which includes the 
determination of possible covariates, number of topic, and other computational settings; 
(3) searching for and selecting an optimal K-value  (number of topics) and running a 
model; (4) topic labeling; (5) estimation of the covariates effects and their interpretation. 
By following this plan, the analysis is conducted, and the results presented in chapter 3 
of this thesis. 
 
2.4. Operationalization and model specification 
To proceed with data collection and analysis, it is important to operationalize variables 
and specify the model for estimation of the covariate effects. Legislative speeches can be 
considered as units of analysis, which have own characteristics. As it was mentioned 
above, the topical prevalence model has been chosen to reveal the topic structure of the 
corpus of legislative speeches made in the House of Commons and its dependency on 
metadata. Considering the formulated hypothesis, the following metadata included as 
‘prevalence covariates’ in the model:  
 Whether the speaker is a cabinet minister or not (cabinet membership status) 
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 Party affiliation of the speaker  
 The degree of speaker’s (MPs’) doubt towards the Brexit deal 
 Time, when speech took place 
Moreover, the model employs spectral initialization, which is more appropriate for better 
convergence and recommended by the developers of the STM method (Roberts et al., 
2016b), and 500 iterations are stated as maximum for model convergence to increase the 
computational reliability. Besides, machine learning techniques imply the random 
subsetting of data, which complicates the process of replication. The seed is set to a value 
of 2019 to provide the replicability to the results.  
To make model calculations and further effect estimations possible, the operationalization 
of independent variables should be conducted. Cabinet membership status is coded as a 
numeric and dichotomy variable, where ‘0’ refers to MPs without executive power, and 
‘1 refers to government MPs. Party affiliation is coded as a factor variable, where each 
factor refers to the party name with which the speaker associated.  
Regarding the MPs in doubt, the operationalization process should be outlined in more 
detail. For this research, MPs in doubt are operationalized considering the MPs' voting 
profile, constructed based on the combination of votes they cast on the government policy. 
This assumption is inspired by and based on the spatial model of roll-call voting, which 
represents the distance between an ideal point of the legislator and proposed policy 
(Carroll and Poole, 2014; Poole, 2005). In the context of this thesis, this variable is a 
factor variable, where combinations of ‘Ayes’ and ‘Noes’ can be considered as factors. 
For instance, there can be three consequent meaningful votes on the same policy in a 
given period. If one imagines that there are only three possible combinations of sequential 
votes, it can be represented, as follows: 
 When legislator voted three times in favor of policy – ‘Aye, Aye, Aye’, 
 When legislator voted three times against the policy proposal – ‘No, No, No’, 
 When legislator voted two times against the policy during the first two votes and 
changed his mind during the last one – ‘No, No, Aye’. 
In the scenario presented in the example, the latter voter will be considered as ‘MP in 
doubt’ during the analysis, since his voting profile represents the inconsistency in 
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legislative voting behavior. Otherwise, if MPs vote consistently on policy, it may indicate 
their adherence to the party or policy position. Also, this factor variable contains the 
sequence of votes according to the order in which votes occurred. Regarding validity, it 
can be inferred that this measurement fully corresponds with the theoretical explanations 
and research goals, but for other research, it can be considered limited due to its factor 
(non-numeric) nature. Regarding reliability, this measure can be used to replicate the 
results of this thesis without any limitations or possible errors.  
Time is also coded as a factor variable, which refers to the important periods when debates 
took place in the following form – ‘Period_#’. It comes from the assumption that there 
are several events, which separate the whole timeframe into meaningful periods. 
However, time is also operationalized through the month number with which the speech 
is associated. Month numbers are taken in a range from 1 to 24, where ‘1’ refers to January 
2018, and ‘24’ refers to December 2019. This measure is transformed into a spline with 
10 degrees of freedom, as suggested by authors of the STM model (Roberts et al., 2016a) 
to control for a non-linear relationship between the effects of time and dependent 
variables.  
When the STM model is run, one can extract and evaluate the effects of the covariates on 
the topic proportions to reveal the expected topic probabilities for each of the factors, and 
then make inferences. All factor variables are also dummy variables in the following 
model, and the first categories of these variables are reference ones to estimations of 
which others’ effects are compared (Hardy, 1993). This model also uses the method of 
composition, which allows to incorporate estimation uncertainty in the dependent 
variable. As per STM default, ‘Global’ method is used, which implies an approximation 
to the average covariance matrix formed using the global parameters (Roberts et al., 
2017). One hundred simulations are conducted to estimate the result, as per model default.  
Thetha (θ) is a dependent variable, which represents the topic porportions of a speech 
exctracted from the STM model results, while others are independent variables. Thus, 
such a model must be run to estimate the effects of covariate:  
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θsk = α + γ1k ∗ C s(i) + γ2k ∗ Ps(i) + γ3k ∗ Vs(i) + γ4k ∗ Ts(i) + γ1k ∗ M s(i) 
where θ – the topic proportions of speech s, by MP i as the dependent variable, 
  γnk - coefficients for estimated difference in topics proportions for legislators’ 
roles and time effects, 
 k – number of topics, 
 C – cabinet membership status of MP i, 
 P – party affiliation of MP i, 
 V – voting profile of MP i, 
 T – period, when speech of MP i was delivered, 
 M – month, when speech of MP i was delivered (splined). 
The month number cannot be a key independent variable for topic proportions instead of 
a ‘period’ variable to evaluate effects, because it can produce a bias related to the topic 
prevalence. For some topics the expected topic probability can acutely increase in 
continuous space due to the possible sharp decline of other topics’ probability. For 
instance, politicians may resolve some issue and stop debating on it. It will lead to 0 
probability of this topic in given period, increasing the probability of others and residuals 
at the same time.  
 
2.5. Research data 
In order to test the formulated hypotheses and address the research question, this thesis 
relies on the legislative speeches related to the Brexit and Theresa May’s Withdrawal 
agreement for the period from July 2018 (Chequers agreement) to July 2019 (Theresa 
May’s resignation). The official and original data on all legislative speeches and other 
procedures, which took place in the House of Commons for the given period, is stored in 
Hansard (2019). Hansard is an official website of the UK parliament dedicated to 
providing open access to the parliamentary data.  
This study uses web scraping techniques of data extracting. These are the sets of methods 
of automatic extracting, sorting, and collection of data from websites (e.g. Munzert et al., 
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2014). Hansard website structure is not a convenient source for such techniques to be 
applied, and, in this case, it was decided to collect the data on legislative speeches using 
the website of TheyWorkForYou project (2019), the participants of which copies the 
Hansard data and present it in a convenient and lossless formats for extraction and 
examining. This project offers data on the legislative speeches in a structured format using 
Extensible Markup Language (XML).  
All legislative speeches were parsed and then filtered in order to extract only those 
debates, which are related to Brexit, because this study aims at examining only one multi-
dimensional and salient issue. The several attributes were parsed to do so: text of 
legislative speeches, their unique numbers, major and minor headings (labels provided by 
the UK parliament), dates of speeches, and names of speakers. Major and minor headings 
associated with speeches were not informative enough, but most of them contained 
references to the Brexit. In this case, the data was sorted by filtering these headings using 
keywords. For example, such keywords were used as ‘Brexit’, ‘Article 50’, ‘Withdrawal 
Agreement’, ‘Deal’, ‘European Union’, ‘Backstop’ and similar to them. By using these 
filters, all relevant speeches were added to the core dataset. However, since the mentioned 
headings did not represent the agenda comprehensively, the rest of the speeches were 
analyzed manually by reading the most informative speeches from each of the groups. If 
these speeches contained references to Brexit deal and relevant arrangements, all 
speeches under respective headings were included in the dataset. This can be considered 
as a limitation of this study, since there are no better techniques to extract only Brexit-
related debates due to the nature of data.  
As the second step, the texts were checked for mistakes and irrelevant information. First, 
most common typos were eliminated together with duplicated speeches. Second, the 
speeches, which contained only actions of MPs (e.g. ‘Hon. Member rose (from the 
bench)’), and collective speeches (‘Several Hon. Members’ as speaker names) were 
removed since most of them included only emotional outcries and physical actions. In 
addition, all speeches, which consist of the less than 65 characters and more than 17000 
were removed as being uninformative and too large, respectively. Third, the speeches 
made by Mr. Speaker, John Bercow, were also taken off from the analysis. Even though 
the Speaker of the House of Commons plays a key role in shaping and managing the 
legislative agenda, this role is neutral, and there is no hypothesis to test concerning the 
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Speaker influence in this study. All procedural speeches of MPs remained in the final 
dataset due to their importance for the analysis. 
Once the dataset with legislative speeches was ready, the data on the membership in the 
government were added. According to the official information of the UK government 
(Ministers, 2019), 70 MPs held the ministerial portfolio from July 2018 to July 2019 and 
made speeches regarding the Brexit. Those MPs, who resigned or left their office during 
this period in opposition to May’s deal, were not considered as government MPs.  
The data on the parliamentary voting and party affiliation were extracted from the official 
UK parliament databases containing information on the Members of the House of 
Commons (2019) and House of Commons Divisions (2019). Party labels were assigned 
to MPs by merging two datasets by names of MPs. The members of eight political parties 
and independent representatives are present in the analysis: Conservative Party, DUP, 
Green Party, Independent, Labour Party, Labour/Co-operative Party, Liberal Democrats, 
Plaid Cymru, Scottish National Party. 
Concerning the parliamentary voting, it was decided to extract the roll-call data on all 
three meaningful votes on the Brexit Withdrawal Agreement. The first one took place on 
15 January 2019, the second MV – on 12 March 2019, and the third MV – on 29 March 
2019. These votes are chosen since they are primarily related to the legislative behavior 
and MPs’ positions towards the government proposal, while others only handled 
amendments, minor topics, extensions of Brexit deadlines, and indicative votes. 
Indicative votes could be considered important for the current research, but since their 
amount is large and reasons are completely different, it would create uncertainty of 
measurements and estimations for the analysis. Therefore, all votes MPs cast were 
merged into a combined votes variable following votes sequence (from 1st to 2nd and 
from 2nd to 3rd MV) and operationalization task. These combined votes represent voting 
profiles of MPs. It resulted in four unique voting profiles for all MPs: (1) ‘Aye, Aye, Aye’ 
– those who voted for the government proposal three times, (2) ‘No, Aye, Aye’ – those 
who voted against the governmental proposal only during the first MV, (3) “No, No, Aye” 
– those who voted for Theresa May’s deal only during the last MV, and (4) ‘No, No, No” 
those who voted against it on all MVs. Those who abstained from at least one vote or did 
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not vote at all were removed from the analysis due to the requirements of STM model, 
which does not operate with missing values.  
Furthermore, two columns were specified regarding time effects. The first one refers to 
month numbers, where the first month is coded as ‘1’ and refers to January 2018, while 
the last month is coded as ‘24’ and refers to December 2019. Considering the timeframe 
chosen for this analysis, the month numbers in the final dataset vary from 7 (July 2018) 
to 19 (July 2019). The second column represents the period. The focal points for each 
period start and end were taken according to the hypotheses, and in association with MVs. 
By being coded as a factor variable, four periods were selected. The period #1 is assigned 
to speeches made from 2 July 2018 (the date of the first speech in the dataset) to 16 
January 2019 (the next day after the first MV and a day of the no-confidence vote). The 
period #2 is assigned to speeches given from 17 January 2019 to 12 March 2019 (the 
second MV took place). Period #3 is a timeframe between the second and third MV (from 
13 to 29 March 2019). The period #4 refers to the rest of the debates and include dates 
from 30 March 2019 to 24 July 2019 (the date of Theresa May’s resignation).  
To sum up, the resulting dataset contains 25559 speeches given for one year and metadata 
on cabinet membership status, party affiliation, and voting profiles of MPs, along with 
time-related characteristics.  Descriptive statistics for the dataset are provided in 
Appendix 1. The most interesting findings are that government MPs are characterized 
with smaller speeches on average than MPs without portfolio. It could mean that 
government MPs used less words to express their ideas, and it could potentially lead to 
the underestimation of government proposal. However, this assumption is to be checked 
in other studies. In addition, MPs from Conservative Party delivered almost a half of the 
speeches in the data, but, simultaneously, their speeches are shorter than speeches of MPs 
from other parties. As for voting profile, it seems that MPs who have an established 
position on the Brexit deal tended to speak the most: those who voted for May’s deal were 
12315 times on the parliamentary floor, while those who voted against – 11230 times. 
However, similar to the findings above, those who favored the Brexit deal the less, spoke 
more in terms of the size of speeches.  
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3. Analysis and Results 
In this chapter, the analysis and its results are presented. According to the research method 
specifics, the textual data prepared for the analysis at first, and then the optimal number 
of topics chosen, and model selected. Afterward, the topic structure of the parliamentary 
debates on the Brexit deal is revealed. On this step, topic labeling conducted, and the most 
prevalent topics are detected. Then the analysis of estimations of the effects of MPs roles 
and time effects on the legislative speechmaking conducted and the results are discussed 
and interpreted sequentially: (1) the hypotheses on the ministerial role of MPs tested and 
discussed; (2) then the effects of part affiliation calculated and interpreted; (3) the 
influence of MPs’ doubts on topic proportions evaluated and interpreted; (4) time 
determinants of the speeches considered and analyzed.  
 
3.1. Text preprocessing and model selection 
The first step towards the analysis of the results is data preparation. In order to get the 
appropriate data format for the analysis based on STM, it is important to conduct a text 
preprocessing. By following the steps proposed by scholars (Banks et al., 2018; Lucas et 
al., 2015) and listed in section 2.3, the data have been transformed into DTM format.  
The texts of legislative speeches were tokenized and transformed into the 'bag-of-words'. 
It was possible by the initial removal of irrelevant elements such as numbers, punctuation, 
symbols, separators, and hyphenated words. The rest of the elements left as one-level n-
grams, meaning that one token of the DTM refers to one word. For example, if two-level 
n-grams were taken, the phrase 'Brexit deal' would go together in the matrix as 
‘brexit_deal’ token. In the case of this research, this phrase consists of two tokens – 
'Brexit' and 'deal'. Furthermore, the normalization was applied together with the removal 
of stop words. The stemming was carried out during the process of stop word removal. 
Even though the lemmatization can be considered as a more accurate method, stemming 
was chosen over it. The reasons for it are that this choice does not affect the overall 
performance of the analysis, and, considering the amount of data, lemmatization would 
require more computational power, estimation time, and relevant dictionaries (Grimmer 
and Stewart, 2013). On this stage of text preprocessing, data stored in a document-feature 
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matrix, which is one of the classes within the ‘quanteda’ package in R developed for the 
text mining (Benoit et al., 2018). By using this matrix, it is available to locate both the 
most and less frequent tokens in texts, and then remove them to avoid Zipf’s law effects 
and sparsity, respectively. Considering the size of the corpus (25559 documents), the 
words appearing in less than ten documents and more than 5000 documents were 
removed. Besides, words consisted of less than 2 characters, were filtered out as well. 
Some words were additionally selected for deletion from the dataset to avoid the low 
interpretability of the topic models. There were also words referred to days of the weeks, 
MPs' titles, introductory words, and uninformative (and modal) verbs. In total, there were 
158 words felt under the filtering. As a result, the words have a distribution depicted in 
Figure 1. The most frequent terms appear in more than 4000 documents, while the least 
frequent in around 15 documents. Even though the sparsity can still be large, the low-
frequency words were not removed since some of them can be quite informative for the 
analysis of the Brexit deal usually associated with very specific vocabulary. The final 
vocabulary size is equal to 5740 unique stems.  
Figure 1. Hansard Debates (Legislative Speeches): Word Frequency vs. Rank 
 
The final steps of text preprocessing were to transform the data into the DTM matrix 
intended for carrying out topic modeling using STM and add the relevant metadata.  
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possible limitations to choose the value of K appropriately. Even though the issue of the 
Brexit withdrawal agreement is  and salient, the sub-components of this issue are limited 
due to the chosen timeframe and logically to the existing and known aspects of this issue. 
As it can be derived from theory and context, the approximate number of topics might lay 
in the range from 20 to 30. This assumption is also reinforced by the existing trade-off 
between the quality and interpretability. It is embedded in the topical modeling theory 
that the larger values of K should produce better quality measurements, but it also implies 
the redundancy, which affects the interpretability (Banks et al., 2018, p. 455).  
By considering these assumptions, several models were built and compared by 
measurements mentioned in section 2.3. Tools provided by ‘stm’ package (Roberts et al., 
2018) allow to search for the appropriate number of K by running several models for each 
expected number of K and by applying spectral initialization, which helps the algorithm 
to select the better one automatically per convergence (Ibid., p. 14). For this analysis, the 
model was specified (five topic prevalence covariates added, and specification set as 
discussed in section 2.4) and run for numbers of topics from 20 to 30. The results of the 
run are illustrated in Figure 2.  
Figure 2. Model Quality Measurements 
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The models with 27 and 29 values of K can be better fits for given corpus of documents 
for several reasons. Firstly, this analysis primarily aims at estimations of covariate effects, 
which can be affected by high residuals. As depicted in Figure 2, the least residuals are 
associated with the 29 K-values. Secondly, the higher semantic coherence might result in 
better interpretability of the topic models. In this case, the model with 27 topics shows 
better performance, while the model with 29 topics has one point less in semantic 
coherence, which is not crucial. As for other measurements, the model with 29 K-values 
shows better performance in predictability and convergence. Other models show the 
worse performance overall, so they are not considered for further analysis.  In order to 
evaluate the quality of both chosen models, STM models were run again, and two 
measures were compared – semantic coherence and exclusivity. The results for the two 
models are depicted in Figures 3.1 and 3.2. 
Figure 3.1. Model with 27 topics 
 
The mean semantic coherence for the model with 27 topics is equal to -97.14382, while 
the mean of the exclusivity measure is equal to 9.874073. It can be considered a very 
good result. However, it is similar to the results of the model with 29 topics (Figure 3.2.) 
For the model with 29 topics, the mean semantic coherence is equal to -98.37618, which 
slightly worse than the estimation for another model. In turn, the mean of the exclusivity 
is equal to 9.887448, which is a better result than the model with 27 topics obtained. 
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Figure 3.2. Model with 29 topics 
 
In this case, one should remind the other measurements, where the model with 27 topics 
loses due to the higher residuals. Thus, 29 can be considered as an optimal number of 
topics for this research. In the following section, the final model is run, and the topic 
structure of the legislative speeches on the Brexit deal is discussed. 
 
3.2. Topic structure of debates on the Brexit Withdrawal Agreement 
The model with the value of K equals to 29 was run. The final model provided words, 
which have the highest probability to be located within each of the topics, and so-called 
FREX - an aggregated measure of frequency and exclusivity of each word for each of the 
topics. As it was outlined in section 2.3, FREX terms can serve better for topic labeling, 
so they were considered in this analysis as keys to the appropriate topic labels. The results 
of topic labeling and all the topics produced by the model are listed in Appendix 2 (Table 
2). All topics exctracted from the model can be considered as the representation of 
parliamentary agenda on Brexit, where each topic refers to one of the sub-components of 
this multi-dimensional issue.  
In some cases, labeling was not a straightforward task, and the documents related to topics 
were examined in-depth to provide more insights and meaning. For instance, the topic 
labeled as ‘Government Criticism/Disputes’ associated with seemingly quite meaningless 
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words, which mostly refer to specific parliamentary vocabulary consisted of party brands, 
MPs’ roles, and other dichotomies. However, the exemplar documents show that this 
topic is associated mostly with speeches, where MPs criticize the Prime Minister, the 
government, and their inability to unite the parliament and manage backbenchers. For 
example, the following speech can be illustrative:  
“The Prime Minister has lost a quarter of her Cabinet and 117 of her Back Benchers 
want her gone. She has experienced the biggest defeat in parliamentary history. What 
shred of credibility have her Government got left? For goodness’ sake Prime Minister, 
won’t you just go?” - Pete Wishart, 16 January 2019 (Hansard, 2019) 
The topic labeled as ‘Failed Negotiations – No-Deal/Norway Scenario’ also suffers from 
this issue. The analysis of documents showed that this topic consists of speeches, where 
MPs blamed the government in failed negotiations and tried to explain the advantages 
and distances of other possible options. There is also an ambiguity in topic labeled as 
‘Democracy and Borders’: while some MPs referred to the British and EU citizens living 
in the UK and their possible issue with a variety of queues (for those with the EU and 
without the EU passports) on border control after Brexit, other MPs also consider it 
discriminative. In this case, this topic primarily relates to the elimination of discrimination 
in any form within and outside of the UK.  
Furthermore, all topics were distinguished into three groups to complement the research 
hypotheses testing goals, which require to determine whether the topic is controversial, 
procedural or niche one. In order to group all the topics, the contextual factors, relevant 
legislative speeches, and topic correlations were taken into account. As a result, there are 
nine topics labeled as controversial, six topics represent procedures, and fourteen topics 
are niche ones.  
Controversial topics are highly related to the number and content of those disputable 
topics, which bothered MPs in case of the Brexit withdrawal agreement: ‘Irish Backstop’, 
various alternatives to Theresa May’s deal (respective topic is ‘Failed Negotiations–No-
Deal/Norway Scenario’), the status of the EU citizens after Brexit and saliency of this to 
labor policy (‘Labour Policy: EU-Citizens’), the extensions of Brexit deadlines 
(‘Extension of Brexit’), the custom unions and food standards (‘Food and Agricultural 
Policy’), possible economic shocks of Brexit under Theresa May’s scenario (‘Economics 
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Criticism’), an inability of government to pass this deal through parliament (‘Government 
Criticism/Disputes’), discussions and promotions of the second referendum on Brexit 
(‘Second Referendum’), and issues related to Scotland (‘Scotland’).  
Procedural topics also represent the set of lexical and topical groups related to the specific 
of the parliamentary process. MPs tend to use very specific parliamentary instruments, 
which require knowledge of specific vocabulary and can indicate the nature of each 
procedure in the House of Commons. There is a topic related to the business of the house, 
and sub-components of it (‘Business of the House’). Moreover, MPs make a substantial 
amount of interventions, which can show the intensity and saliency of debates 
(‘Interventions’). Second legislation proposals related to the Brexit deal or ‘Statutory 
Instruments’ are also conceptualized as procedural proposals since discussions on them 
primarily based on very specific procedures and strict legal vocabulary. One of the most 
important procedural topics – ‘Cabinet Answers to Questions’ – refers to the paramount 
role of the parliament in democracies to control the government. In turn, government MPs 
have own patterns of responses to parliamentary questions and rely on ‘convincing’ 
vocabulary. Besides, ‘Legal Advice’ is also a very important instrument possessed by 
MPs. It allows them to ask the Attorney General for his legal opinion on laws and policies. 
The very interesting procedural topic is ‘Thanks for Debates’, which represent speeches 
when MPs thank each other for the debates in a certain manner.  
Other topics are considered niche ones, and primarily related to the less salient sub-
components of the Brexit deal issue. However, the topic ‘Future Relationships-UK-EU’ 
is associated with legislative speeches and words, which intends to present advantages of 
the government deal and refer to the explanation of the Political Declaration of the 
withdrawal agreement. By speaking on this topic, MPs determine the most crucial point 
of the future relationships between the UK and EU and discuss the positive implications 
of further joint and cooperative actions.  
One might also examine the correlations between topics to make inferences on the 
relationships among them and validate the grouping procedure. The results of the 
estimated topic correlations presented graphically in the form of a network of topics in 
Appendix 3. According to the network structure, the niche topics are located very close 
to each other on the left side of the network. They are also related to the cabinet responses 
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to questions. It can be logically explained by the fact that most niche topics were raised 
in the form of questions, and these questions themselves represent topics. One more 
interesting finding is that the topic ‘Regional Politics’ correlates positively with most of 
the niche topics. It can also be explained by the multidimensionality of the Brexit deal 
discussions and its comprehensive influence on constituencies observable even in less 
salient aspects. 
In the middle of the network, the most controversial topics are located, and they connect 
niche and procedural topics. It means that controversial topics are central for the 
parliamentary debates on the Brexit deal, and they constructed the whole process of 
legislative speechmaking on this issue. Besides, the assumptions regarding the ’Future 
Relationships-UK-EU’ have been confirmed: this topic is central for debates and even 
being favorable for the government, it also helped to shape the agenda. The one 
controversial topic, which is located between niche topics, is ‘Labour Policy: EU-Citizens 
status’. It can be explained by the specifics of these topics and its relation to other niche 
topics such as ‘Education’ and ‘Healthcare’. In this study, contextual relevance is more 
important for the analysis, so such a peculiarity was not considered substantial. 
All procedural topics (except ‘Cabinet Answers to Questions’ due to the reasons 
mentioned above) are located on the right side of the topic correlation network. These 
topics also correlate with those controversial, which also can include discussions on 
procedures, legal adjustments, and rules. For instance, extensions of Brexit deadlines, the 
second referendum, and No-Deal should be subjects of debates on their procedural 
grounds, amendments, and indicative votes related to these proposals and the following 
decisions.  
Also, STM allows us to identify and estimate the topic prevalence, or its expected 
proportion based on the effects of covariates. This estimation shows the saliency of each 
topic (or the sub-components of the issue) for the parliamentary debates through the 
amount of time each topic was discussed in comparison with time allocated to discussions 
of other topics. A sum of all expected topic proportion is equal to 1.  The results of this 
estimation are illustrated in Figure 4. Topic proportions were also used to construct the 
correlation network (Appendix 3) in order to make it reflect the prevalence of each topic 
in the corpus of parliamentary debates by the size of nodes. 
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According to the results, one might infer that grouping procedure and correlation 
estimations are done properly, since the most prevalent topics are relatively controversial, 
and niche topics have lower values of expected topic proportions.  
Figure 4. Topic structure and expected topic proportions 
 
In turn, several meaningful interpretations should be made. First, the most prevalent topic 
is ‘Cabinet Answers to Question’. It means that the UK parliament serves its purpose of 
controlling the government, and most of time in the debates is devoted to the government 
accountability responsibilities in front of MPs. Secondly, the discussion of other 
alternative options to Theresa May’s deal and failed negotiation with the EU is the second 
one among the most prevalent topics. It means that rather than discussing the government 
proposal itself, MPs put more efforts in offering alternatives and criticizing government. 
It can be also confirmed by the topics, who ranked third and fourth by their proportion - 
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‘Extension of Brexit’ and ‘Second Referendum’. Theresa May’s solution was not only 
the subject of rejection and the reason for delays in delivering the Brexit, but also a sign 
to citizens that Brexit is a very complex issue, and it cannot be done without huge loses 
for all affected. In this case, the second referendum on Brexit, which could result in its 
cancellation, can also be an alternative option to any withdrawal agreement. Furthermore, 
even though the issue of the Irish Backstop is considered to have key importance, it is 
only fifth in prevalence. ‘Interventions’ are seventh in prevalence order, which means that 
the parliamentary debates on the Brexit deal were quite intricate, and MPs interrupted 
each other very often. As a result, the first eight topics can be considered as ‘salient’ sub-
components of the Brexit deal issue since they have the largest expected proportions and 
strongly differentiate from others. 
In turn, some controversial issues were not discussed so often as it could be predicted 
from the context. The problems of Scotland are ranked nineteenth, and topics related to 
customs unions (‘Food and Agricultural Policy’ and ‘Economics Criticism’) and EU-
citizens status have the medium expected topic proportions indices as well. At the same 
time, such niche issues as education and environment received the least attention from 
the MPs, even though these issues were widely discussed in media.  
To sum up, one might remind the theoretical expectations regarding the Westminster 
system and agenda control (e.g. Bowler, 2010; Russell and Cowley, 2016). These 
expectations are that the government in the Westminster system should fully control the 
legislative agenda, while the parliament has a low influence on shaping it. In the case of 
the Brexit deal, the government allowed MPs to devote most of the speeches on the 
parliamentary floor to the critique of its proposal that can be seen from the proportions of 
controversial topics. Even though the exact and final interpretations of this peculiarity 
cannot be made only based on the topic proportions, it is an important finding in terms of 
the current study. To some extent, it correlates with an idea presented by Russel and his 
colleagues (2015) that the role of the Westminster parliament is overlooked because it is 
not always visible from published data. By revealing the hidden structure of the 
parliamentary agenda, this role can be examined further in more depth. 
Since the topic structure of the legislative debates on the Brexit deal is outlined in this 
section, the effects of covariates on the topic proportions can be estimated further to test 
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the hypotheses. The model is run based on the specifications determined in section 2.4. 
All results and interpretations presented in the following section rely on outputs of 
regression models tabled in detail in Appendix 4. Additionally, for visualization, several 
topic labels were shortened to: ‘Transport Policy’ for topic 2, ‘Failed Negotiations 
(Alternatives)’ for topic 7, ‘Government Criticism’ for topic 14, ‘EU-citizens status’ for 
topic 19. 
 
3.3. Cabinet membership and legislative speeches 
In order to address the hypotheses related to the cabinet membership of MPs, the 
estimated effects of this characteristic on the topic prevalence can be used for inferences. 
Generally, if government MPs speak significantly more on the issue than other MPs, it 
will be indicated by coefficients and their p-value. Numeric results of the regression run 
presented in Appendix 4 can also be plotted for convenience to capture the differences 
between covariates (see Figure 5). 
According to the results, the role of MP as a member of the cabinet makes a difference 
for legislative speechmaking. Such an inference can be made since the proportions of 
most of the topics can be explained by the role of MPs, which can be whether non-cabinet 
or cabinet. Only eight topics were discussed in an equal manner, and their proportions do 
not depend on the cabinet membership of MPs. For other topics, one can choose randomly 
one of them and say whether non-cabinet or cabinet MP will speak more on this topic by 
looking at estimation results. For instance, if one takes ‘Legal Advice’, this topic will be 
more likely contained in speeches delivered by non-cabinet MP than government MP on 
the parliamentary floor. 
Regarding the hypotheses derived from the policy-seeking motivations of MPs, they were 
only partially confirmed. Firstly, government MPs do tend to control very prevalent topics 
and thus speak on salient issues sufficiently. However, if one looks at the results, ‘Cabinet 
Answers to Question’ is the topic mostly associated with government MPs as well 
as ‘Statutory Instruments’. These are procedural topics and they do not represent the issue 
per se but procedures of parliamentary debates. As for topics, which associated with the 
higher saliency and more meaningfulness, government MPs are more likely to speak 
about future relationships between the UK and EU and on the Brexit deadlines extensions 
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than non-cabinet MPs. The latter topic can also be under the government MPs control due 
to their important role in negotiations on the extension. Therefore, government MPs 
control only two salient topics. In turn, non-cabinet MPs tend more likely to speak on 
controversial and prevalent topics related to the discussions of the alternatives to Theresa 
May’s deal and the critique of the government. At the same time, non-cabinet MPs are 
more likely to interrupt other MPs. In total, two salient topics and one important 
procedural topic are ‘controlled’ by government MPs, and the same is true for non-cabinet 
MPs. 
Figure 5. Cabinet Membership and Topic Prevalence 
 
In this case, one might assume that the government failed to control the most salient topics 
because MPs in both roles tend to speak more on the same number of ‘salient’ topics. 
More specifically, it means that the first hypotheses of this study were not confirmed 
fully: government MPs are not likely to speak more on salient issues in the context of the 
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Brexit deal debates. However, it does not necessarily mean that the government failed in 
controlling the legislative agenda: other salient topics such as the Irish backstop and the 
second referendum are not significantly influenced by the cabinet membership role, 
which could be a result of government’s actions, party discipline or negotiations. 
However, this assumption cannot be checked in this study.  
Secondly, government MPs are not more likely to speak on procedural topics than MPs 
without a position in government. By making this inference, the second hypothesis related 
to policy-making motivations was disproved. Besides the fact that non-cabinet MPs are 
more likely to refer to more procedures in their speeches (four procedural topics are 
significantly associated with non-cabinet MPs), they tend to control the business of the 
house and, as expected from theory,  influence the agenda-setting substantially. Thus, by 
considering only partial confirmation of the first hypothesis and rejection of the second, 
one should infer that Theresa May’s government was not able to control the legislative 
speechmaking in the House of Commons to the degree expected for the Westminster 
system. Likely, the UK government did not pay enough attention to the shape of the 
legislative agenda, or they simply were incapable to control it due to the extensive critique 
and uncertainty. As a result, they were not able to convince the parliament to vote in favor 
of their withdrawal agreement. However, this assumption can be fully tested in future 
studies. 
As for the hypothesis regarding office-seeking, it can be confirmed but with several 
limitations. Since it is more likely that speeches, which contain favorable topics for 
government such as the future relationships of the UK and EU, healthcare, security and 
information, and statutory instruments (secondary legislation can be considered very 
important for the Brexit deal), are made by government MPs than by non-cabinet MPs, 
one might infer that government MPs do not criticize themselves and do not want to lose 
their office. However, estimations also show that government MPs tend to speak more 
about Brexit extension and EU-citizens status in the UK, which are controversial topics 
in the context of this research. This can be explained by the nature of these topics. 
Regarding the extensions, the government is responsible for negotiations about the 
deadlines and ensuring that No-Deal will not happen. Therefore, the government has 
incentives not to allow the no-agreement scenario, because otherwise, there is a high risk 
of resignation. As for EU-citizen status, the proportion of this topic in the parliamentary 
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speeches on the Brexit deal is not large enough to consider this topic as a salient sub-
component of the issue. It seems that MPs paid less attention to this topic than media or 
scholars. Thus, government MPs were able to take this topic under control to make it 
work in their favor. In turn, non-cabinet MPs do tend to speak more on topics unfavorable 
for government proposals. They are more likely to be associated with speeches regarding 
alternatives to Brexit and no-deal ruling out, criticism of the government, and economics 
pitfalls of Theresa May’s deal. Thus, both sides speak on the parliamentary floor with 
'mega-seats' in mind: while government MPs would like to keep their offices safe and not 
to speak against themselves, non-cabinet MPs question the government's actions as per 
the ordinary procedure. 
These results correlate significantly with the vote-seeking behavior of MPs shaped by 
their cabinet membership status. If government MPs should defend their policy in order 
to show their performance and effort, non-government MPs tend to criticize the 
government to meet expectations of their voters. This assumption is proved in line with 
the theoretical expectations and formulated hypothesis. On the one hand, government 
MPs do fulfill their role of accountable servants by answering to representatives’ 
questions a lot. In this regard, Figure 5 is a demonstrative proof of this assumption. On 
the other hand, non-cabinet MPs play their role of government controllers and 
representatives of voters by questioning the government on the controversial topics and 
interrupting others to get clearer points (‘Interventions’).  
To sum up, two hypotheses out of four regarding the role of cabinet membership status 
were completely confirmed. Generally, the fact of whether MP is a cabinet member or 
not affected significantly the content of legislative debates on the Brexit withdrawal 
agreement. It provided several implications. Theresa May’s government was most 
probably not able to shape the legislative agenda in a way expected by the theory of 
Westminster systems. Government MPs did not control the prevalent amount of the 
salient sub-components of the Brexit deal discussion and were incapable to make non-
cabinet MPs speak significantly less about controversial topics. This assumption was also 
confirmed by the fact that non-cabinet MPs participated more in the procedural talks and 
controlled the business of the house. Under these circumstances, government MPs could 
not achieve their policy goals. However, they were driven enough by office-seeking 
motivations not to speak on topics unfavorable for themselves. The same is true for vote-
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seeking and non-cabinet MPs: they spoke more on controversial topics and ask questions 
about niche ones to address the issues of their constituencies and, eventually, to get more 
votes.  
These findings contribute not only to the literature on legislative speechmaking, but also 
to the research on agenda-setting and agenda control power of the government in 
Westminster system, and could be a starting point for studying the Brexit arrangements 
from the point of parliamentary disputes. Moreover, the assumptions on the possible 
reasons for losing control over the policy process and on the causes of the focused 
attention in speeches on topics, which could help with keeping seats and gaining votes 
instead of policy goals, can be tested in future studies in more depth. 
 
3.4. Party affiliation and legislative speeches 
The hypotheses testing on the role of party affiliation for the parliamentary debates on the 
Brexit withdrawal agreement is carried out in the same manner and by keeping the similar 
triangle of motivations in mind. Parties are also policy-, office-, and vote-seeking actors 
on the political arenas. Legislative debates provide their members with an opportunity to 
speak in ways consistent with their goals. In this case, MPs will take roles of party 
members that might both put constraints on what they talk about on the parliamentary 
floor and create incentives to speak more on certain topics. 
Considering the hypothesis related to policy-seeking motivations, it is important to note 
that the content of legislative speeches here depends on ‘position-taking’, which refers to 
the necessity for parties to differentiate themselves from other coalition partners in their 
opinions towards certain policies, not only from opposition parties. As a result, parties 
from the same coalition tends to speak equally a lot on those policy aspects, which divide 
them, to achieve consensus and differentiate themselves from each other. In order to 
confirm or disprove it, one might refer to the differences between the probability of topics 
raised by the Conservative Party and DUP. Then it is important to have a look at the 
significance of the topic, which divided both parties during the debates on the Brexit deal 
– Irish backstop. As it can be inferred from the estimation results in Appendix 4 and their 
illustration in Figure 6, there is no difference in probability for this topic to be raised by 
Conservative or DUP MPs. As for the significance of the ‘Northern Ireland’ topic for 
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DUP MPs, it cannot be considered as a divisive issue, because this topic refers to the local 
issues of Northern Ireland. However, it can be proof of vote-seeking motivations on the 
parliamentary floor since DUP owns this topic due to regional affiliation. In turn, to 
provide the complete proof for hypothesis on policy-seeking, one should also examine 
the effects on topic proportions produced by MPs, whose parties belong to different 
parliamentary coalitions. The most illustrative example is the difference between topics, 
which are raised by Conservative and Labour parties. 
Figure 6. Conservative Party and DUP 
 
By looking at Figure 7, one might confirm that MPs, whose parties are from different 
coalitions, tend to speak completely different on topics, which divide them. As can be 
seen from the illustration, such divisive issues as the second referendum and alternatives 
to Brexit are owned by Conservative MPs and Labour MPs, respectively. The interesting 
finding is that Conservative MPs are more likely to speak about the second referendum, 
which was initially proposed and supported by Labour Party, while Labour MPs are more 
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likely to talk about alternatives such as No-Deal, which were advocated traditionally by 
some Conservatives. It could be caused by reversed attention: parties may critique each 
other’s proposals and use it as an instrument in disputes, which produces more talks about 
opponents’ weaknesses.    
Figure 7. Conservative Party and Labour Party 
 
Apart from the confirmation of the hypothesis on the policy-seeking intentions of parties, 
these differences also shed light on the office-seeking behavior of MPs. MPs from the 
governing party, who are supposed to speak more on topics favorable for government 
proposals to help their party in offices, did not do so in case of the Brexit deal debates. 
According the results presented in Figure 7, Conservative MPs are more associated with 
such controversial topics as ‘Irish backstop’, ‘Second Referendum’, and ‘Food and 
Agricultural Policy’, while MPs from the opposition party (Labour Party) are more 
focused on such salient issue as possible alternatives to Brexit and less prevalent 
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discussions regarding EU-citizens status. Moreover, there are no significant differences 
between topics related to government and economics criticism and Scotland. It reveals 
that MPs from the governing party tends to raise the attention to controversial topics and 
can reduce the chances to keep their party in office. In the case of the Brexit deal, it can 
be explained by the role of backbenchers, who opposed Theresa May’s deal.  Their 
rebellion transformed not only into votes against the deal but also influenced what they 
talk about on debates. One cannot say for sure that attention to controversial topics should 
always mean opposition because sometimes there is nothing for MPs to do but to respond 
and explain the disputable points. However, as derived from the theory, if such attention 
implies negative consequences for the party to keep the office, then they would probably 
reduce this attention but do not to raise it. Therefore, the second hypothesis was not 
confirmed.  
Parties as vote-seekers tend to ‘own’ some issues and consider them salient because the 
traditional perceptions shape voters’ behavior. In order to demonstrate to voters their 
adherence to resolving these ‘traditional’ issues, MPs should speak more on topics, which 
are related to issues their parties traditionally own. The case of the Brexit deal is not an 
exception. Estimation results presented in Appendix 4 show that, for example, SNP and 
DUP own such topics as ‘Scotland’ and ‘Northern Ireland’ respectively that can be 
explained by their national orientations. In turn, Green Party owns environmental issue, 
Liberal Democrats spoke more about security and information, Labour parties associated 
more with social policy-related topics, while Conservatives prefer to discuss foreign 
policy. The confirmation of this can also be found in Figures 6 and 7.  
Nevertheless, MPs from the large parties have more incentives, resources, and knowledge 
to speak about the most important and controversial sub-components of the Brexit deal.  
Estimation results confirm this hypothesis. For instance, MPs from the Labour Party are 
more likely to talk on controversial and salient topics than MPs from SNP or Labour/Co-
operative Party (see Appendix 5). It follows the theoretical assumption that to get more 
votes on elections large parties should struggle for the attention on the salient issue so 
voters can detect efforts parties put into its resolution. This lets one confirm the last 
hypothesis regarding the role of party affiliation on the legislative speeches. 
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To sum up, parties did play a significant role in shaping the legislative debates on the 
Brexit withdrawal agreement. The results show that all hypotheses found confirmation 
but one. This hypothesis is related to the office-seeking strategies parties employ to keep 
their offices and assumes that MPs from the governing party should not raise more 
attention to the controversial topics in their speeches than MPs from other parties. 
However, in the case of parliamentary debates on the Brexit deal, it was not so. Two 
possible reasons for it can be tested in future studies. First, it seems that the degree of 
party rebellion was too high in the Conservative Party, and instruments of party discipline 
did not work. One might assume that office-seeking behavior lost a trade-off to vote-
seeking motivations. Conservative MPs were not scared of losing office, because they 
could anticipate re-elections, which would lead to a better situation for them. It can be 
partially confirmed by the success of Boris Johnson on the 2019 parliamentary elections. 
The second reason lays in a trade-off between policy goals and keeping the ministerial 
portfolios. It could be so that for some Conservatives losing the governing status implied 
fewer costs than voting and speaking in favor of Theresa May’s agreement. Eventually, 
it led to the fact that some Conservatives had no constraints to free speech against the 
government proposal on the debates. Nevertheless, other hypotheses confirmed. MPs 
from parties of the same coalitions - Conservative and DUP MPs – spoke equally about 
the Irish backstop that could be caused by their desire to show differences and achieve 
better policy solutions. Issue ownership theory also found its confirmation in the case of 
parliamentary debates on the Brexit deal – the most salient sub-components of this issue 
were owned by MPs from large parties, while niche components were associated with 
MPs, whose parties are their traditional owners. 
These findings contribute to the understanding of MPs' legislative behavior, determinants 
of legislative speechmaking, and shed light on possible outcomes of party unity measures. 
The case of debates on Theresa May’s deal could not be only the starting point to examine 
the relationships within British political parties, but can also be illustrative for other cases, 
when MPs face the similar multi-dimensional challenges as Brexit. Besides, these 
findings might add to the literature on Westminster systems and the role of parties and 
their place in government. Their role in the determination of MPs’ incentives to speak in 
one or another way is interesting to examine in cases when widely acknowledged 
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motivations such as office-seeking can lose a trade-off to other motivational paradigms 
completely. 
3.5. Personal voting profiles of MPs and legislative speechmaking 
Personal voting profiles of MPs, according to the theoretical expectations, might also 
reflect peculiarities of legislative speechmaking. Resulting profiles can be considered as 
results of both the influence of party discipline and personal preferences. These 
preferences may refer to all points of the triangle of motivations. Considering the 
limitations of the research method and the case of the Brexit deal as such, this study 
operates with an assumption that there are only two types of MPs – those who have a 
consistent and formulated opinion on the Theresa May’s withdrawal agreement, and those 
who are in doubt. Such characteristics may potentially shape the way how MPs speak on 
the parliamentary floor, what topics they consider important, and, as a result, what 
distinguishes them. Since most of the possible mechanisms such as party discipline, 
negotiations behind closed doors, and psychological factors, which could affect the 
content of speeches of individual MPs, are hidden from the view and hold constant, one 
of the things that can be done is to compare the products of their influence – parliamentary 
speeches.  
Meaningful votes on Theresa May’s Brexit deal generated several voting profiles, 
including profiles of those, who abstained one or multiple times, or did not vote on for 
some reason. Since abstention is not in focus of this study, one can only consider MPs, 
who voted in all three meaningful votes. The data shows that there only four profiles for 
such MPs. The first two represent MPs, who voted consistently for or against the 
government proposal. The third present MPs who cast a vote against the withdrawal 
agreement only during the first meaningful vote. The fourth characterizes MPs, who voted 
against the proposal twice – on the first and the second meaningful vote. Therefore, two 
later profiles indicate that MPs are in doubt towards the Withdrawal Agreement. 
As the hypotheses outline, there are two ways to compare the effects of ‘doubts’ on 
legislative speechmaking. The first way is to compare MPs in ‘doubt’ with those who in 
a consistent manner, so-called static way. Here it is expected that MPs in doubt regarding 
the Brexit deal should speak more on niche sub-components than MPs who have a ‘clean’ 
profile. The second way is to compare MPs with each other to reveal the dynamic changes 
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in legislative speechmaking. Here it is expected that those MPs, who have fewer doubts 
in May’s proposal, should speak less on controversial issues.  
In order to test the first assumption, the estimations of topic proportions are compared for 
both profiles related to MPs in doubt with the profile of those, who voted only for or 
against the Brexit deal. The results of these estimations presented graphically in Appendix 
6. According to the results, this hypothesis found confirmation in three cases out of four. 
Such niche topics as ‘Transport Policy’, ‘Domestic and International Crimes’, 
‘Education’, ‘Defense Policy’, ‘Environmental and Energy Policy’ and ‘Regional 
Politics’ are more associated with MPs in doubt. The only case, which did not comply 
with expectation, is the difference between MPs, who voted consistently for the 
government proposal, and those who voted for it only on the third meaningful vote. Such 
deviation can be explained by the possible effects of time. The period before the third 
meaningful vote is significantly larger than the period after it. It could affect the results 
since those MPs were in doubt for more time and could deliver substantially more 
negative speeches on Theresa May’s deal than they managed after this period. The 
contextual factors also confirm this assumption: Boris Johnson, who opposed the deal for 
the whole period, vote ‘for’ the proposal on the last meaningful vote. As for those who 
voted for the deal three times, it is expected that they are less likely to raise controversial 
topics on the parliamentary floor. Nevertheless, the hypothesis that MPs in doubt paid 
more attention to the local and niche issues can be confirmed.  
The inferences made above are also suitable for the second hypothesis. As illustrated in 
Figure 8, the degree to which MPs are in doubt towards the Brexit deal can predict the 
topics they will most likely speak about in the House of Commons.  
However, the same limitations apply to this case. Those MPs who changed their minds in 
favor of the government proposal only for the third meaningful vote simply could have 
not enough time to speak in its defense. Nonetheless, if one examines the differences 
between MPs in doubt and those who rejected the government proposal for three times, 
it will become clear that voting behavior can be reflected by legislative speeches. Thus, 
MPs, who had fewer doubts about Theresa May’s deal, also had fewer incentives to speak 
about controversial and salient topics. 
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Figure 8. MPs in doubt compared 
 
To sum up, the hypotheses regarding the MPs in doubt were confirmed, but with some 
important limitations. Firstly, in a static way, MPs, who voted inconsistently on the Brexit 
withdrawal agreement tend to be more associated with niche and local topics, while those 
who have a well-established opinion spoke more on the controversial and salient issue on 
the parliamentary floor. Secondly, from a dynamic perspective, MPs, who changed their 
minds towards more favorable for the Theresa May’s deal earlier along the way, and thus 
who had fewer doubts, tend to speak more on niche topics than those who were in more 
doubts. Thirdly, one may infer that the effects of time play an important role in such 
estimations since some MPs simply have less time to contribute to topics favorable for 
May's deal. However, even though the theory provides several explanations for such 
peculiarities of legislative speechmaking, the real reasons and mechanisms cannot be 
explained in this study. On the one hand, it could be the effect of the party discipline in 
action. On the other hand, other powers could make MPs focus on niche issues instead of 
being busy with resolving the salient issue related to the Brexit deal such as backbencher 
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status, constituency links, personal qualities, etc. These suggestions can be researched in 
the future to provide a more comprehensive picture of the situation in the House of 
Commons. In general, these findings contribute to the literature not only on the British 
political system but also to research on both legislative speechmaking and voting. Since 
the voting profiles can represent the MPs’ positions to some degree, it should reflect their 
overall opinion on policies they have to vote. In this scenario, there is a probability that it 
can explain how and about what MPs talk on the parliamentary floor. 
 
3.6. The importance of time effects for the content of legislative 
speeches 
In the previous section, the importance of time effects for legislative speechmaking has 
been already raised. The parliamentary discussions on the Brexit withdrawal agreement 
held for one year, and during this time the emphases could change under the pressure of 
external and internal events, as well as political positions of MPs, and the proposed policy 
itself.  
The one-year of debates was divided into four consecutive periods by considering the 
dates related to meaningful votes and a no-confidence vote. The last fourth period was 
eliminated from the analysis since the parliamentary debates on the Brexit deal became 
less intense and did not lead to any meaningful results after the third meaningful vote 
except Theresa May's resignation. 
The theory implies that after the confidence motions, which often serve as a disciplinary 
measure, the presence of controversial topics in MPs' speech can be reduced. To test this 
hypothesis, one may refer to the difference in topic probabilities between the first period 
(before the vote of no-confidence) and the second period (between 1st and 2nd MV). As 
illustrated in Figure 9, this hypothesis cannot be confirmed. On the one hand, the saliency 
of such controversial topics as ‘Irish backstop’, ‘Economic Criticism’, and ‘Second 
Referendum’ is associated more with the period before the no-confidence vote in a 
statistically significant manner. On the other hand, the second period contributed more to 
discussions on the government's inability to deliver the appropriate Brexit 
deal (‘Government Criticism’) and talks about EU-citizens status in the UK after 
Brexit (‘EU-Citizen Status’). 
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Figure 9. Effects of time - 1st and 2nd MVs 
 
Moreover, third period marked by more explicit contribution to such controversial topics 
as ‘Scotland’, ‘Extension of Brexit’, Food and Agricultural Policy’, ‘Government 
Criticism’, even though this period was rather small – only 17 days, while 1st period 
refers to 7 months (see Figure 10 for insights). Despite that hypothesis can be disproved, 
several important implications derive from these findings. The initial goal was to examine 
if the controversial issues can lose their saliency after the no-confidence vote (which took 
place on 16 January, or the next day after the first meaningful vote). Even though it is 
impossible to detect and capture the exact mechanism by using methods this study 
employs, the goal was to check if such a shift takes place at all. Since one could not detect 
or capture the effects of time, it cannot be inferred that the confidence motion or any other 
factors did or did not have any influence on legislative speeches. However, in the case of 
the debates on the Brexit deal, the saliency of most issues was increasing from one stage 
to another. It seems from the results that the first period contributed comparatively more 
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only in the discussion of the Irish backstop, while other controversial issues could receive 
more attention on other stages.  
Figure 10.Effects of time – 1st and 3rd MVs 
 
These results do not also allow to confirm the second hypothesis on losing issue saliency 
sequentially from one stage to another, which was inspired by the assumption of 
legislative behavior theory that the government can use anticipated reaction and 
negotiations to make its policy pass the parliament. As Figure 11 shows, during the third 
period, MPs contributed more in discussions on some salient and controversial topics than 
during the second one.  
Despite that the hypotheses on the effects of time were not confirmed, one could see that 
there are still some peculiarities for any period, and topics distributed unevenly among 
them. According to the results, the period before the first MV and confidence vote 
contributed more to discussions on Irish backstop and the economic disadvantages of the 
Brexit deal. The second period was marked by the debates on such important sub-
component as EU-Citizen status in the UK after Brexit and many more niche topics. In 
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turn, the third period was primarily devoted to the debates on alternatives to Brexit, the 
extension of deadlines, and the second referendum.  
Figure 11. Effects of time - 2nd and 3rd MVs 
 
To sum up, there is no evidence that controversial topics disappear from the agenda with 
more stages of debates on policy passed or after the confidence votes. These results can 
potentially imply that there are other powers, which affected the topic distribution in time. 
It could be, for example, the media attention, the state of negotiations between the UK 
government and the EU officials, party discipline, and other political shocks and events. 
By considering the findings of this study regarding the topics’ distributions in time among 
the periods of the Brexit deal debates, these assumptions can be studied in-depth in future 
research. Nonetheless, one should also consider the specifics of the model run here and 
possible lags in the effects.    
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Conclusion 
The aim of this thesis was to reveal the determinants of legislative speechmaking, which 
produces significant differences in what the members of parliaments speak about on the 
parliamentary floor regarding one salient issue. In order to do so, the case of the 
parliamentary debates on the Brexit Withdrawal Agreement was selected to shed light on 
the differences in speeches delivered in the House of Commons. 
By comparing the assumption from the theory on Westminster system that in times of 
crises and political shocks parliaments tend to unite with government to deliver fast and 
appropriate solution, with the case of debates on Theresa May’s Withdrawal Agreement, 
one revealed that in the British case it was not true since the agreement did not pass the 
parliament after one year of debates and negotiations, and it follows to Theresa May’s 
government resignation.  
To address this research puzzle, this study assumed that the analysis of legislative 
speeches might help in understanding the differences, which divided MPs. While other 
studies in the field were mostly focused on procedural, electoral, and other institutional 
determinants of the legislative speechmaking, this thesis provides insights on the 
importance of roles, which MPs can preserve on the parliamentary floor.  By adopting the 
strategic and partisan-rhetoric approach to legislative speechmaking and considering that 
the content of speeches on debates can be shaped by the policy-, office- and vote-seeking 
motivations imposed by the various roles MPs can play in the British parliaments, this 
study assumed that cabinet membership, party affiliation, personal preferences, and time 
effects can produce significant differences in what MPs speak about in the House of 
Commons during the discussions of such multi-dimensional and salient issues as the 
Brexit deal. The latter also can be considered novelty since other studies tend to reveal 
the patterns associated with the whole parliamentary term or focused on comparing the 
parliamentary agenda of different national legislature. On the contrary, this study operates 
in the framework of one salient and complex issue examining its components, which can 
be lost if one takes the big picture.  
Following the assumptions formulation, legislative speeches were considered as unit of 
analysis, and the sub-components of the discussion on the Brexit deal were 
conceptualized as topics of the debates. It was decided that the most appropriate research 
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method to estimate the effects of MPs roles on the legislative speeches and reveal the 
hidden topic structure of the all debates is Structural Topic Models. The dataset consisted 
of 25559 legislative speeches and relevant metadata on the Brexit deal, which was deliver 
by MPs in the House of Commons from July 2018 to July 2019, was collected by using 
web-scraping techniques. By using the topic models quality measurements and 
validations, the model with 29 topics was selected and further analyzed.  
As a result, topic structure of the debates reflected the reality. Topics, which were mostly 
discussed and divide MPs were considered as controversial, while other topics were 
considered niche. By considering the specifics of parliamentary procedure, some topics 
were also considered as procedural. Analysis showed that the most controversial topics 
at the same time appeared to be the most prevalent during the parliamentary debates.  
Analysis of the role of MPs as members of cabinet showed that cabinet membership status 
produces the differences in legislative speechmaking of MPs. It was revealed that 
government MPs failed at controlling the most salient topics related to the Brexit debates 
and were not able to control the most important procedures. Even though the real reasons 
for it remained unobservable, it was inferred that the government did not achieve its goal 
towards creating the situation on the parliamentary floor, which would be favorable for 
Theresa May’s proposal. However, government MPs contributed significantly more in 
topics, which are favorable for this proposal, and by doing so they were motivated by 
desire to remain in the office. In turn, government MP answered on substantial amount 
of questions asked by other MPs on various components of the Brexit deal. It reflected 
the theoretical expectations regarding the accountability of government in front of the 
parliament. Moreover, non-cabinet MPs were more likely to criticize the government and 
interrupt the speakers that depicts the intensity and saliency of disputes on Theresa May’s 
deal. These findings contribute to the theory on agenda control and Westminster system, 
and cast doubt on the assumption that the government under such system fully control the 
parliamentary agenda.   
As for MPs roles as party members, this study confirms the hypotheses derived from the 
theory of parliamentary coalitions and issue ownership. Regarding coalition, it was 
confirmed that Conservative MPs and DUP MPs speak equally a lot on the issue, which 
divide them – Irish backstop. Regarding the issue ownership, the findings are in line with 
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the theoretical expectations that parties tend to ‘own’ issues, which traditionally 
associated with them. The contribution of this study is that it proved the same behavior 
of MPs in the context of one multi-dimensional issue. Moreover, this study also showed 
that larger party have more incentives and knowledge to speak on controversial and 
complex issues than their small counterparts. However, MPs from the governing 
Conservative Party contributed more to the controversial topics and talks, which were 
unfavorable for the government. It showed that the office-seeking motivations could be 
not so important for Conservatives, and the degree of party rebellion was too high. This 
finding contributes to the theory of party unity and studies on the British politics by 
making a statement that most probably office-seeking is not so important for party 
members in cases of salient issues, and it loses its significance to policy goals and vote-
seeking motivations. 
In turn, this study employs the assumptions from the theory on parliamentary voting to 
conceptualize personal preferences of MPs. Deriving from the models of spatial 
preferences and considering contextual factors, MPs were distinguished into two groups 
by keeping in mind their distance to government policy – those who consistently voted 
on the Brexit deal and those who voted inconsistently or was in doubt. As estimations 
showed, MPs in doubt are less likely to contribute to controversial topics, while MPs with 
strong opinion towards policy were more active regarding disputable points.  Even though 
the assumption for this were taken from the theory of party discipline, this study was not 
aimed at revealing the real mechanisms, which led to such behavior. It can be examined 
in future studies. The effects of debate stages did not confirm the relevant hypotheses but 
showed how the discussion evolved through stage. If Irish backstop and economics 
disadvantages were most important for the period before the first meaningful vote on the 
Brexit deal, the second period was marked by the debates on such important sub-
components as EU-Citizen status in the UK after Brexit, while the third period was 
primarily devoted to the debates on alternatives to Brexit, the extension of deadlines, and 
the second referendum.  
Thus, the findings of this thesis contribute to the literature on legislative speechmaking, 
legislative behavior, party unity, and can be used for future studies of the Westminster 
systems, British politics, and can be a starting point in examining Brexit phenomenon in 
more depth. 
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APPENDIX 1 
   
Table 1. Research Data. Descriptive statistics 
Variables  Factors # of speeches Mean speech 
length (in 
characters) 
Cabinet 
membership 
Government MPs (1) 8847 (34.6%) 663.2 
MPs without portfolio 
(0) 16712 (65.4%) 955.12 
    
Party 
Conservative 14419 (56.4%) 727.5 
DUP 397 (1.6%) 1040.31 
Green 63 (0.2%) 1169.83 
Independent 1568 (6.1%) 1035.77 
Labour 5211 (20.4%) 1044.33 
Labour/Co-operative 845 (3.3%) 938.04 
Liberal Democrats 592 (2.3%) 925.08 
Plaid Cymru 138 (0.5%) 910.51 
SNP 2326 (9.1%) 997.74 
    
Voting profile 
(combined 
votes) 
Aye, Aye, Aye 12315 (48.2%) 719.47 
No, Aye, Aye 831 (3.2%) 886.47 
No, No, Aye   1183 (4.6%) 783.5 
No, No, No 11230 (43.9%) 1006.71 
    
Periods 
Period 1 11685 (45.7%) 913.02 
Period 2 5479 (21.4%) 828.93 
Period 3 3107 (12.2%) 839.98 
Period 4 5288 (20.7%) 758.15 
    
Year 2018 9891 (38.7%) 853.37 
 2019 15668 (61.3%) 854.52 
    
Total  25559 (100%) 854.1 (min – 65, max – 16262) 
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APPENDIX 2 
Table 2. Topics, FREX terms, and Labels 
# of 
topic  
Label (prevalence 
rank) FREX terms (n = 12) Group 
1 Food and Agricultural Policy 
agricultur, tariff, fish, fisheri, market, farmer, export, food, farm, free, custom, 
movement, water, singl, anim  Controversial 
2 Transport Policy and Post Services 
rail, local, shop, offic, post, bus, driver, station, network, tram, street, closur, 
author, centr, railway  Niche  
3 Education pupil, school, educ, parent, teacher, sport, children, digit, loneli, colleg, onlin, teach, age, young, art  Niche  
4 Extension of Brexit extens, meaning, tomorrow, date, march, statement, box, dispatch, januari, indic, confirm, letter, februari, clarifi, offici  Controversial 
5 Scotland scotland, scottish, snp, welsh, devolut, wale, devolv, scot, perth, perthshir, nationalist, english, pete, ross, grab  Controversial 
6 
Business of the House 
(PoT, Motions and 
Amendments) 
bill, select, committe, procedur, dorset, chair, session, pontefract, castleford, 
letwin, normanton, oliv, clerk, backbench, shall  Procedural 
7 
Failed Negotiations - 
No-Deal/Norway 
Scenario 
option, compromis, consensus, reject, red, revok, clock, articl, major, tonight, 
line, proposit, sensibl, choic, renegoti  Controversial 
8 Interventions word, moment, ago, intervent, minut, littl, perhap, anoth, coupl, deputi, mind, least, probabl, slight, remark   Procedural 
9 Future Relationships - UK-EU 
futur, unit, relationship, best, kingdom, interest, partnership, posit, advantag, 
negoti, deliv, partner, rest, whole, abil  Niche  
10 Statutory Instruments instrument, regul, statutori, sis, legisl, chemic, draft, provis, exit, consult, bodi, authoris, financi, domest, explanatori  Procedural 
11 Irish Backstop backstop, declar, arrang, withdraw, period, bind, treati, unilater, implement, text, transit, altern, negoti, white, barnier  Controversial 
12 Healthcare nhs, patient, mental, care, cancer, health, hospit, dementia, medic, social, drug, clinic, doctor, treatment, nurs Niche 
13 Economics Criticism  economi, analysi, poorer, wors, econom, gdp, damag, forecast, bad, predict, job, hit, lose, growth, worst Controversial 
14 Government Criticism/Disputes 
bench, bencher, resign, front, opposit, whip, mps, labour, shadow, leadership, 
leader, shambl, conserv, blame, game Controversial 
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15 Domestic and International Crimes 
rohingya, refuge, knife, victim, violenc, crime, investig, polic, babi, prison, 
death, women, camp, burma, abus  Niche 
16 Industry and Production manufactur, suppli, port, conting, chain, contract, ferri, industri, steel, automot, dover, jaguar, compani, eurotunnel, disrupt  Niche 
17 Defence Policy raf, veteran, arm, personnel, aircraft, tribut, air, armi, memori, forc, regiment, anniversari, soldier, celebr, commemor  Niche 
18 Democracy and Borders citizen, sanction, religi, christian, antisemit, racism, messag, venezuela, protest, hate, hatr, passport, human, islamophobia, regist  Niche 
19 
Labour Policy: EU-
Citizens (and 
Immigration policy) 
immigr, univers, visa, disabl, credit, scienc, migrat, payment, system, scheme, 
student, worker, fee, migrant, research  Controversial 
20 Cabinet Answers to Questions 
rais, awar, absolut, happi, encourag, meet, discuss, ensur, number, specif, 
concern, direct, cours, obvious, seek  Procedural 
21 Budgeting and Social Policy 
cut, budget, spend, poverti, tax, money, fund, auster, extra, homeless, incom, 
household, wage, million, billion  Niche 
22 Environment and Energy Policy 
emiss, carbon, renew, climat, slaveri, energi, petit, properti, reunion, grenfel, 
plastic, cornwal, electr, rent, modern Niche 
23 Legal Advice attorney, advic, lawyer, learn, general, judgment, holborn, legal, court, pancra, starmer, interpret, opinion, advis, convent  Procedural 
24 Second Referendum referendum, elect, manifesto, democraci, second, result, honour, voter, elector, second, democrat, believ, betray, mandat, campaign  Controversial 
25 Thanks for Debates speech, listen, heard, spoke, passion, express, view, chamber, somerset, colleagu, tone, spoken, admir, mid, disagre  Procedural 
26 Northern Ireland northern, ireland, belfast, irish, republ, border, cup, assembl, footbal, féin, sinn, sea, southend, paisley, potato  Niche 
27 Regional Politics citi, region, london, project, mayor, birmingham, midland, beauti, east, yorkshir, glasgow, manchest, stoke, north, wealth  Niche 
28 Foreign Policy foreign, russia, yemen, global, influenc, intern, trump, aid, nato, saudi, diplomat, russian, syria, commonwealth, america  Niche 
29 Security and Information secur, protect, oper, data, agenc, particip, progress, gibraltar, focus, warrant, ongo, reach, smooth, prioriti, safeguard  Niche 
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APPENDIX 3 
   
Figure. Topics (Correlation) Network (n = 29).2 
 
 
  
 
2 The size of nodes refers to the topic proportion (prevalence) within the corpus 
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APPENDIX 4 
Table 3.1.  Estimated effects of covariates on topic-proportions for topics 1-8. Topic 
numbers are taken from Table 2 (Appendix 2). 
DV – Topic proportions 
(topic #) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
(Intercept) 0.0685*** 
(0.0028) 
3.028e-02** 
(2.191e-03) 
0.0193*** 
(0.0024)   
0.019*** 
 (0.0026) 
7.3e-02*** 
(3.187e-03) 
3.129e-02*** 
(2.636e-03) 
0.0205*** 
(0.0027) 
0.037*** 
(0.001) 
Cabinet Membership (1) -0.0149*** 
(0.0021) 
-2.159e-03 
(1.54e-03) 
0.0007 
(0.0016)    
0.011*** 
(0.002) 
-1.e-02*** 
(2.078e-03) 
-4.240e-03* 
(1.882e-03) 
-0.0203*** 
(0.002) 
-0.0148*** 
(0.001) 
Party (2): DUP -0.00095 
(0.0059) 
1.796e-03 
(3.78e-03) 
0.0066 
(0.004)    
-0.0176** 
(0.0059) 
-2.72e-03 
(4.961e-03) 
-4.2e-02*** 
(4.964e-03) 
-0.0274*** 
(0.0057) 
-0.0085* 
(0.003) 
Party: Green 0.0043 
(0.013) 
9.783e-03 
(9.3e-03) 
0.004  
(0.009)   
-0.0075 
(0.0133) 
-1.12e-02 
(1.045e-02) 
-3.274e-02** 
(1.077e-02) 
0.048** 
(0.018) 
0.0092 
(0.0064) 
Party: Independent -0.0039 
(0.00285) 
-8.67e-03*** 
(1.86e-03) 
0.0013 
(0.0023)    
-0.008*** 
(0.003) 
-1.e-02*** 
(2.417e-03) 
-3.614e-04 
(2.951e-03) 
0.044*** 
(0.003) 
0.0115*** 
(0.0017) 
Party: Labour -0.0092** 
(0.0029) 
9.54e-03*** 
(2.10e-03)   
0.0147*** 
(0.002)   
-0.004 
(0.003) 
2.736e-04 
(2.535e-03) 
-2.38e-02*** 
(2.901e-03) 
0.02*** 
(0.0036) 
-0.004* 
(0.0017) 
Party: Labour/Co-
operative 
-0.008 ¤ 
(0.004) 
1.12e-02*** 
(3.16e-03)    
0.024*** 
(0.0042) 
-0.017*** 
(0.0042) 
5.045e-05 
(3.673e-03) 
-2.37e-02*** 
(4.725e-03) 
0.009 ¤ 
(0.005) 
-0.005927* 
(0.0024) 
Party: Liberal Democrat -0.0056 
(0.0043) 
3.459e-03 
(3.444e-03)    
0.007* 
(0.0037) 
-0.012* 
(0.005) 
1.2e-02** 
(4.532e-03) 
-1.9e-02*** 
(4.885e-03) 
0.037*** 
(0.006) 
-0.0048 ¤ 
(0.0026) 
Party: Plaid Cymru 0.0089 
(0.0097) 
2.110e-03 
(6.098e-03)    
0.0037 
(0.007) 
-0.002 
(0.0089) 
1.1e-01*** 
(1.304e-02) 
-2.560e-02** 
(8.356e-03) 
0.0199 ¤ 
(0.01) 
-0.006254 
(0.005) 
Party: SNP 0.0067* 
(0.0031) 
3.451e-03 
(2.234e-03) 
0.0073** 
(0.0025)   
-0.018*** 
(0.003) 
9.5e-02*** 
(4.176e-03) 
-3.25e-02*** 
(3.337e-03) 
0.0026 
(0.004) 
-0.002 
(0.0018) 
Period (3): Period 2 0.00118 
(0.0036) 
8.579e-03*** 
(2.42e-03) 
0.004 
(0.0026)    
0.004 
(0.0035) 
1.04e-02** 
(3.317e-03) 
9.996e-03*** 
(2.868e-03) 
0.0006 
(0.0035) 
-0.004359** 
(0.0017) 
Period: Period 3 0.013* 
(0.005) 
9.403e-03** 
(3.46e-03)    
0.0027 
(0.0038)   
0.02*** 
(0.005) 
1.35e-02** 
(4.685e-03) 
3.926e-02*** 
(4.332e-03) 
0.04*** 
(0.0055) 
0.007102** 
(0.0025) 
Period: Period 4 -0.0135 
(0.014) 
-7.080e-03 
(1.11e-02) 
-0.0316* 
(0.013)   
0.022 
(0.015) 
-6.8e-02*** 
(1.661e-02) 
1.472e-01*** 
(1.492e-02) 
0.0945*** 
(0.015) 
0.0485*** 
(0.007) 
Profile (4): No, Aye, Aye -0.0033 
(0.0041) 
1.98e-02*** 
(3.24e-03)   
0.01*** 
(0.0033)   
-0.0075* 
(0.003) 
-1.44e-02*** 
(3.913e-03) 
-7.406e-03* 
(3.490e-03) 
-0.008* 
(0.004) 
0.0086*** 
(0.00226) 
Profile: No, No, Aye -0.0081* 
(0.0032) 
-6.341e-03** 
(2.431e-03)  
-0.006* 
(0.0025)  
0.009** 
(0.0035) 
-2.08e-02*** 
(3.179e-03) 
7.715e-03* 
(3.253e-03) 
0.0018 
(0.0033683) 
0.00635** 
(0.002) 
Profile: No, No, No -0.0088** 
(0.003) 
-9.112e-03*** 
(2.132e-03)   
-0.0099*** 
(0.0022)  
0.022*** 
(0.003) 
-2.07e-02*** 
(2.739e-03) 
2.101e-02*** 
(3.009e-03) 
0.013*** 
(0.0035) 
0.0086*** 
(0.0019) 
Signif. codes:  0***, 0.001**, 0.01*, 0.05¤. Reference categories for dummies: (1) ‘Conservative Party’ 
for parties; (2) ‘Period_1’ for periods; (3) ‘Aye, Aye, Aye’ for voting profile. Month numbers were 
excluded as not interpretable splines.  Considering estimations uncertainty, they slightly change by each 
model run, but significance remains the same. Scientific notations were left to save space. 
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Table 3.2.  Estimated effects of covariates on topic-proportions for topics 9-16. Topic 
numbers are taken from Table 2 (Appendix 2). 
DV – Topic proportions 
(topic #) 
9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
(Intercept) 0.06*** 
(0.002) 
0.0225*** 
(0.0023) 
6.03e-02*** 
(3.188e-03) 
0.028*** 
(0.0026) 
2.007e-02*** 
(2.308e-03) 
0.033*** 
(0.0023) 
0.0234*** 
(0.0028) 
0.0415*** 
(0.0031) 
Cabinet Membership (1) 0.027*** 
(0.0018) 
0.009*** 
(0.0017) 
3.35e-03 
(2.062e-03) 
0.0049** 
(0.0018) 
-6.347e-03*** 
(1.494e-03) 
-0.0154*** 
(0.0017) 
0.0013 
(0.0018) 
-0.0046* 
(0.002) 
Party (2): DUP 0.0049 
(0.005249) 
-0.0019 
(0.0055) 
5.534e-05 
(6.655e-03) 
-0.0006 
(0.0048) 
-1.902e-02*** 
(4.281e-03) 
-0.0232*** 
(0.0043) 
0.0173** 
(0.0056) 
-0.0057 
(0.0056) 
Party: Green -0.022* 
(0.009) 
0.0009 
(0.0111) 
-6.5e-02*** 
(1.245e-02) 
0.0041 
(0.0104) 
2.775e-02* 
(1.270e-02) 
0.0247* 
(0.0124) 
0.0101 
(0.0121) 
0.0049 
(0.0131) 
Party: Independent -0.0011 
(0.002) 
0.0095*** 
(0.0027) 
-1.6e-02*** 
(3.154e-03) 
-0.0022 
(0.0024) 
3.429e-03 
(2.212e-03) 
0.0094*** 
(0.00217) 
-0.0034 
(0.0025) 
0.0069* 
(0.0027) 
Party: Labour -0.0136*** 
(0.0023) 
-0.0039 
(0.0025) 
-4.2e-02*** 
(3.711e-03) 
0.0146*** 
(0.0023) 
4.269e-04 
(2.418e-03) 
0.003313 
(0.002641) 
0.022*** 
(0.0027) 
0.02*** 
(0.0031) 
Party: Labour/Co-
operative 
-0.0138*** 
(0.0035) 
0.0045 
(0.00372) 
-5.1e-02*** 
(5.022e-03) 
0.0216*** 
(0.0043) 
5.738e-03 
(3.901e-03) 
-0.001177 
(0.0039) 
0.0227*** 
(0.0041) 
0.0264*** 
(0.0049) 
Party: Liberal Democrat -0.0067 ¤ 
(0.0037) 
-0.0074 ¤ 
(0.004) 
-4.8e-02*** 
(5.634e-03) 
0.01878*** 
(0.0048) 
3.871e-05 
(3.850e-03) 
0.0042 
(0.0043) 
0.0034 
(0.004) 
0.012* 
(0.0052) 
Party: Plaid Cymru -0.0118 ¤ 
(0.006619) 
0.0062 
(0.008) 
-4.8e-02*** 
(9.831e-03) 
-0.0097 
(0.0072) 
1.753e-03 
(7.404e-03) 
0.0013 
(0.0075) 
-0.0038 
(0.0083) 
0.0135 
(0.009) 
Party: SNP -0.0116*** 
(0.0027) 
-0.0051 ¤ 
(0.0028) 
-6.0e-02*** 
(4.107e-03) 
0.0071* 
(0.0029) 
5.093e-03 ¤ 
(2.900e-03) 
0.0226*** 
(0.00287) 
0.0075** 
(0.0029) 
0.0157*** 
(0.003) 
Period (3): Period 2 -0.0029 
(0.0027) 
-0.0059* 
(0.0027) 
-3.4e-02*** 
(3.593e-03) 
-0.0148*** 
(0.0028) 
-1.230e-02*** 
(2.788e-03) 
0.02*** 
(0.0026) 
0.0109*** 
(0.003) 
-0.0098** 
(0.0033) 
Period: Period 3 -0.0011 
(0.0039) 
0.004 
(0.004) 
-9.370e-02*** 
(5.575e-03) 
-0.0134** 
(0.0044) 
-1.197e-02** 
(3.963e-03) 
0.029*** 
(0.004) 
0.00483 
(0.004) 
-0.064*** 
(0.005) 
Period: Period 4 -0.017150 
(0.012754) 
0.0315* 
(0.013) 
-1.0e-01*** 
(1.488e-02) 
-0.04355** 
(0.015) 
-4.003e-02*** 
(1.205e-02) 
0.0347** 
(0.0125) 
-0.0132 
(0.015) 
-0.1179*** 
(0.017) 
Profile (4): No, Aye, Aye -0.0117*** 
(0.003) 
-0.0066* 
(0.0033) 
-6.44e-03 ¤ 
(3.887e-03) 
0.00914* 
(0.0035) 
6.434e-05 
(3.164e-03) 
-0.01061 
(0.0031) 
0.0182*** 
(0.0038) 
-0.0085* 
(0.0039) 
Profile: No, No, Aye 0.0116*** 
(0.002824) 
0.0006 
(0.0026) 
2.77e-02*** 
(3.622e-03) 
-0.0078* 
(0.003) 
1.455e-04 
(2.608e-03) 
-0.0032 
(0.0025) 
-0.0036 
(0.003) 
0.003 
(0.0036) 
Profile: No, No, No -0.0091*** 
(0.002481) 
-0.0002 
(0.0026) 
2.78e-02*** 
(3.738e-03) 
-0.00602* 
(0.0026) 
1.435e-02*** 
(2.497e-03) 
0.012*** 
(0.0026) 
-0.00232 
(0.00278) 
-0.0086** 
(0.003) 
Signif. codes:  0***, 0.001**, 0.01*, 0.05¤. Reference categories for dummies: (1) ‘Conservative Party’ 
for parties; (2) ‘Period_1’ for periods; (3) ‘Aye, Aye, Aye’ for voting profile. Month numbers were 
excluded as not interpretable splines.  Considering estimations uncertainty, they slightly change by each 
model run, but significance remains the same. Scientific notations were left to save space. 
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Table 3.3.  Estimated effects of covariates on topic-proportions for topics 17-24. Topic 
numbers are taken from Table 2 (Appendix 2). 
DV – Topic proportions 
(topic #) 
17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 
(Intercept) 0.034*** (0.0031) 
0.016*** 
(0.0019) 
0.0175*** 
(0.0024) 
0.0396*** 
(0.0024) 
3.013e-02*** 
(2.814e-03) 
0.02*** 
(0.0025) 
0.026*** 
(0.003) 
0.0435*** 
(0.002) 
Cabinet Membership (1) -0.0104*** (0.002) 
-0.0057*** 
(0.0016) 
0.0051** 
(0.0017) 
0.0735*** 
(0.0017) 
3.336e-03 ¤ 
(2.027e-03) 
0.0005 
(0.001) 
-0.0088*** 
(0.0023) 
0.0029 
(0.0022) 
Party (2): DUP 0.0107 ¤ (0.0056) 
0.0269*** 
(0.0056) 
0.0012 
(0.0048) 
0.0006 
(0.004) 
-3.271e-03 
(5.634e-03) 
-0.008* 
(0.004) 
-0.0149* 
(0.0065) 
-0.041*** 
(0.0055) 
Party: Green -0.0178 ¤ (0.01) 
0.0086 
(0.009) 
0.0196 
(0.014) 
-0.008 
(0.0096) 
-9.449e-03 
(1.229e-02) 
0.045** 
(0.0158) 
-0.019 
(0.0143) 
-0.005 
(0.0137) 
Party: Independent -0.0158*** (0.0024) 
0.0059** 
(0.0021) 
0.0168*** 
(0.002) 
-0.0173*** 
(0.0022) 
-1.356e-02*** 
(2.611e-03) 
-0.0028 
(0.0023) 
-0.0056 ¤ 
(0.0031) 
-0.0146*** 
(0.0029) 
Party: Labour 0.00327 (0.0027) 
0.0028 
(0.002) 
0.024*** 
(0.0026) 
-0.0067** 
(0.0023) 
1.849e-02*** 
(2.965e-03) 
0.01*** 
(0.0024) 
-0.029*** 
(0.0035) 
-0.0329*** 
(0.0033) 
Party: Labour/Co-
operative 
0.0039 
(0.0041) 
0.0028 
(0.003) 
0.02*** 
(0.0039) 
-0.0012 
(0.00342) 
1.845e-02*** 
(4.241e-03) 
0.0112** 
(0.0036) 
-0.036*** 
(0.0048) 
-0.03*** 
(0.0045) 
Party: Liberal Democrat -0.00393 (0.0044) 
0.0018 
(0.003) 
0.0360*** 
(0.0054) 
0.0033 
(0.00383) 
-2.444e-03 
(5.012e-03) 
0.0056 
(0.0037) 
-0.022*** 
(0.0057) 
-0.015** 
(0.0052) 
Party: Plaid Cymru -0.0036 (0.0079) 
-0.0036 
(0.0061) 
0.024** 
(0.0088) 
-0.0099 
(0.0068) 
4.560e-03 
(9.052e-03) 
-0.0012 
(0.007) 
-0.036*** 
(0.009) 
-0.0155 ¤ 
(0.009) 
Party: SNP 0.00122 (0.0032) 
0.01*** 
(0.0024) 
0.034*** 
(0.0032) 
-0.0046 ¤ 
(0.0026) 
3.322e-04 
(3.441e-03) 
0.0023 
(0.0026) 
-0.028*** 
(0.0042) 
-0.0271*** 
(0.0038) 
Period (3): Period 2 0.00354 (0.0029) 
0.0064** 
(0.002) 
0.0304*** 
(0.0033) 
0.0182*** 
(0.0028) 
4.745e-03 
(3.311e-03) 
0.0071* 
(0.0028) 
-0.021*** 
(0.0035) 
-0.0123*** 
(0.0034) 
Period: Period 3 0.0096* (0.0044) 
0.01** 
(0.0032) 
0.024*** 
(0.0048) 
0.024*** 
(0.004) 
-1.972e-03 
(4.794e-03) 
0.0106** 
(0.004) 
-0.0695*** 
(0.0059) 
0.0065 
(0.0048) 
Period: Period 4 -0.0056 (0.015) 
0.0922*** 
(0.011) 
0.051** 
(0.0155) 
0.0055 
(0.0131) 
7.995e-04 
(1.691e-02) 
0.013 
(0.015) 
-0.0465** 
(0.015) 
-0.0172 
(0.0148) 
Profile (4): No, Aye, Aye 0.0009 (0.0039) 
0.00317 
(0.0028) 
0.008* 
(0.0037) 
-0.008* 
(0.0031) 
5.673e-03 
(4.165e-03) 
0.009* 
(0.0038) 
-0.0068 
(0.0043) 
0.0059 
(0.0042) 
Profile: No, No, Aye -0.0036 (0.0034) 
-0.0037 
(0.0026) 
-0.0085** 
(0.0028) 
-0.00336 
(0.0028) 
-4.513e-03 
(3.554e-03) 
-0.0073** 
(0.0027) 
0.0215*** 
(0.0045) 
0.0106** 
(0.0037) 
Profile: No, No, No -0.012*** (0.0029) 
-0.0044* 
(0.002) 
-0.0117*** 
(0.0025) 
-0.0092*** 
(0.0024) 
-2.914e-
03(2.991e-03) 
-0.007** 
(0.0025) 
0.0236*** 
(0.004) 
0.0139*** 
(0.0036) 
Signif. codes:  0***, 0.001**, 0.01*, 0.05¤. Reference categories for dummies: (1) ‘Conservative Party’ 
for parties; (2) ‘Period_1’ for periods; (3) ‘Aye, Aye, Aye’ for voting profile. Month numbers were 
excluded as not interpretable splines.  Considering estimations uncertainty, they slightly change by each 
model run, but significance remains the same. Scientific notations were left to save space. 
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Table 3.4.  Estimated effects of covariates on topic-proportions for topic 25-29. Topic 
numbers are taken from Table 2 (Appendix 2). 
DV – Topic proportions 
(topic #) 
25 26 27 28 29 
(Intercept) 0.03742*** 
(0.00171) 
0.0362*** 
(0.0026) 
0.0374*** 
(0.0019) 
0.0337*** 
(0.002) 
0.03694*** 
(0.00195) 
Cabinet Membership 
(1) 
-0.0111*** 
(0.00129) 
-0.002 
(0.0016) 
-0.014*** 
(0.00145) 
-0.0097*** 
(0.00148) 
0.011*** 
(0.0013) 
Party (2): DUP -0.008** 
(0.00295) 
0.1654*** 
(0.0089) 
-0.0002 
(0.0037) 
-0.01085** 
(0.0038) 
0.00068 
(0.00329) 
Party: Green 0.0002 
(0.007) 
-0.0139 
(0.0088) 
0.0094 
(0.01) 
-0.0225** 
(0.008) 
0.005 
(0.0073) 
Party: Independent 0.01319*** 
(0.0016) 
0.0018 
(0.0024) 
-0.0010 
(0.002) 
-0.0009 
(0.0023) 
0.00364 ¤  
(0.00189) 
Party: Labour -0.0012 
(0.0017) 
-0.0031 
(0.002) 
0.0108*** 
(0.00213) 
-0.01156*** 
(0.0021) 
0.01*** 
(0.00176) 
Party: Labour/Co-
operative 
0.00089 
(0.0024) 
-0.006837 ¤ 
 (0.0035) 
0.018*** 
(0.0033) 
-0.0097** 
(0.003) 
0.00461 ¤  
(0.00243) 
Party: Liberal 
Democrat 
0.01080*** 
(0.00298) 
-0.0122*** 
(0.0037) 
0.0046 
(0.0039) 
-0.00867* 
(0.0036) 
0.00866** 
(0.0028) 
Party: Plaid Cymru -0.0127** 
(0.00435) 
-0.0103 
(0.0064) 
0.0131* 
(0.00665) 
-0.00777 
(0.007) 
-0.0042 
(0.0047) 
Party: SNP -0.0069*** 
(0.0019) 
-0.0038 
(0.0027) 
0.0025 
(0.0022) 
-0.0127*** 
(0.0024) 
0.00289 
(0.002) 
Period (3): Period 2 -0.01087*** 
(0.0019) 
-0.0105*** 
(0.0028) 
0.0059* 
(0.0025) 
-0.0091*** 
(0.0025) 
0.003 
(0.0019) 
Period: Period 3 0.0034 
(0.00247) 
-0.018*** 
(0.004) 
0.00592 ¤ 
(0.0035) 
0.00418 
(0.00345) 
-0.0076** 
(0.0027) 
Period: Period 4 0.0139 ¤ 
(0.00776) 
-0.0291* 
(0.011) 
-0.0102 
(0.0111) 
0.0176 
(0.01107) 
-0.00614 
(0.00964) 
Profile (4): No, Aye, 
Aye 
-0.0011 
(0.0021) 
-0.0014 
(0.0034) 
0.00428 
(0.003) 
-0.00393 
(0.003) 
-0.0069** 
(0.0021) 
Profile: No, No, Aye -0.001 
(0.0018) 
0.0015 
(0.003) 
-0.0088*** 
(0.0022) 
-0.00875*** 
(0.0026) 
0.00349 
(0.0022) 
Profile: No, No, No -0.00835*** 
(0.00192) 
-0.0015 
(0.0025) 
-0.01287*** 
(0.00195) 
0.00016 
(0.0022) 
-0.0122*** 
(0.0018) 
Signif. codes:  0***, 0.001**, 0.01*, 0.05¤. Reference categories for dummies: (1) ‘Conservative Party’ 
for parties; (2) ‘Period_1’ for periods; (3) ‘Aye, Aye, Aye’ for voting profile. Month numbers were 
excluded as not interpretable splines.  Considering estimations uncertainty, they slightly change by each 
model run, but significance remains the same. Scientific notations were left to save space. 
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Figure. Labour Party and SNP 
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